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Abstract of the paper 
 
 
The paper analyses the agricultural policy of the Habyarimana regime, which ruled Rwanda from 1973 to 1994. 
Econometric analysis of rural household survey data is used to investigate the effects of the 1989 crop failure in 
southern Rwanda on children’s health status. The paper shows that children in southern Rwanda are chronically 
malnourished, more then in other prefectures of Rwanda. It is shown that the 1989 crop failure developed into 
famine and the causes of this development are investigated. It turns out that the Habyarimana regime did not 
respond to early warnings of famine conditions and pretend it did not know what was going on. The relationship 
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“Rwanda is clearly at a crossroads, in that the old strategy is no longer viable : the vision of a nation of self-
sufficient peasants, meeting through their labor alone their needs for food and shelter , leading tranquil and 
meaningful lives centered around the local community, unbeholden to the world without, that vision is no longer 
sustainable.” 






In the second half of the eigthies, Rwanda entered a period of economic decline. Food 
production per capita decline, low coffee and tea prices , unfavourable weather conditions, 
unsolved refugee questions, demographic growth, mounting corruption and  political unrest 
characterise this period. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, western donors began to demand 
democratization, also in Rwanda. On top of a drought and a local crop failure in 1989 came a 
rebel invasion in late 1990. These rebels were the offspring of the 1959 Tutsi refugees who had 
not been allowed to return to Rwanda. The government argued that « Rwanda did not have 
enough land to settle the former refugees » (MRND decision, 1986). In the subsequent years, 
Rwanda experienced a growing demand for democratisation both from oppostion parties within 
the country, from the donor community and from the rebels. From 1990 to 1993 a series of 
battles occurred between the rebels and the government forces, the latter winning these battles 
with the support of French paratroopers. A peace agreement was signed in Arusha in 1993. Hard   3 
core MRND supporters however did not accept power sharing with the rebels and had already 
begun preparing large scale massacres of the civilian Tutsi population from the beginning of the 
civil war.  
 
It is in this context of growing political and economic unrest that a nation-wide rural household 
survey was conducted by the Rwandan Department of Agricultural Statistics (DSA) and 
Michigan State University under the direction of Dan Clay. The first round of this survey took 
place from October 1988 till March 1989 (the 1989a season), the second round took place from 
April 1989 till September 1989 (1989b). This was repeated in 1990 and 1991. The survey thus 
contains data from a sesaon before the 1989 local crop failure (which took place in 1989b), from 
the crop failure season itself and from two seasons following the local crop failure (1990a and 
1990b). Since the civil war broke out in October 1990, the survey also has data from two seasons 
following this outbreak (1991a and 1991b). The 1989b crop failure was ‘local’, i.e. limited to the 
southern prefectures (especially Gikongoro). The civil war could also be labelled ‘ local ‘ , at least 
in the time frame covered by the survey (the 1991b season ran till September 1991) because the 
battles were restricted to the northern prefectures (especially Byumba and Ruhengeri).  
 
In fact, the above mentioned survey consisted of several parts : an agricultural survey (6 rounds 
1989-1991), a market transaction survey (4 rounds, 1990-1991), a coffee survey (1992, covering 
the three previous years) and a health survey (3 rounds, one in 1991 and two in 1992). The 
sample size is 1248 households, representing 78 clusters (one cluster in one sector of one 
commune) of 16 households per cluster. This method yields a nationally representative sample. 
In the present study, these surveys will be linked together to obtain one large dataset with 
detailed information on household members, health, agricultural production, land, livestock, and 
market transactions. The outcomes of these surveys can be compared to the 1984 national 
household survey (which used another sample) to get a picture of changes over time. 
 
The main objective of the paper is the study of the 1989 crop failure. For this purpose, we will 
use agricultural data on production and consumption and data on the nutritional status of 
children in Rwanda. It is generally accepted that height for age is a good indicator of long-run 
child nutritional status. Low height for age, compared to an international standard is an indicator 
of chronic malnutrition. We will study the determinants of the nutritional status in Rwanda and 
relate it to the 1989 crop failure, the ruling agricultural policies, the civil war and the subsequent   4 
genocide. Recently, genocide scholars have argued that more attention should be given to study 
the links between famine and genocide (Jonassohn, 1999). It is the purpose of this paper to relate 
the agricultural policy of the Habyarimana regime and the 1989 famine with the genocide. In 
doing so, we want to combine the tools of economic analysis with the passion for human rights. 
The content of the text is as ordered as follows : part two of the text discusses the characteristics 
of the rwandan peasant economy, part three describes the 1989 food crisis and entitlement 
failure. . In part four, we discuss the causes of the famine and relate these to agricultural policies. 
Part five presents the econometric analysis of children’s nutritional status and part six links the 
famine with the genocide. 
 
From the data, and this should be stressed, it wil become that we are not dealing with a famine 
that killed several thousand people in the course of a few months. In terms of mortality, we 
cannot talk of a real famine. If however we consider famine as a prolonged period in which a 
serious food crisis breaks down the fabric of society, the word ‘famine‘ applies to southern 
Rwanda in 1989. We are dealing with a creeping agricultural crisis, the result of several years of 
hardship in which households have depleted resources and cannot cope anymore with another 
crop failure.  
 
 
2. AGRICULTURE IN RWANDA 
 
 
2.1. The income of Rwandan households 
 
Fully 93% of Rwanda’s population live in rural areas and nearly all rural households are engaged 
in farming. On average, households cultivate 0.89 hectare of land, the vast majority of these 
landholdings being owner operated. Beans, sorghum, sweet potatoes and casssava are the main 
food staples and bananas, potatoes and coffee the main cash crops. Farming is labor intensive, 
women’s labor is particularly important in food crop production and men’s labor is crucial in 
cash crop production and animal husbandry. Hoes and machetes are the basic farm implements ; 
animal traction is nonexistent. Marginal lands once set aside for pasture or left in long fallow are   5 




According to Bart (1993), the Rwandan peasantry has set up an inventive and efficient 
agricultural system.
2 This system, that has managed to avoid famine most of the time, is a 
complex mixture of food and cash crops, cultivated on slopes and in valleys, combined with 
some small livestock (and cattle for the richer peasants) and some income from beer brewing, 
other business activities or an off-farm income. The chosen mix being the result from personal, 
household, local and climatic characteristics. Between the altitude of 1500m and 1700m, we find 
the ideal conditions for many crops, explaining the high population densities found on this 
altitude level. Clay et al. (1995) have calculated that two thirds of the cultivable land in Rwanda is 
cultivated. The rest consists of fallow land, pasture and woodlot. Half of Rwanda’s cultivated 
fields are intercropped and 56% of these grow bananas in association with food crops such as 
beans, sorghum and sweet potatoes.
3 Intercropping appears to be a response to land scarcity, as 
it is practised more often by households with relatively few land per person. Less intercropping 
occures in high-altitude areas where few or no bananas are grown. In terms of shares of land, the 
main crops are bananas (26%), beans (17%), sweet potatoes (11%), cassava (9%), sorghum (9%) 
and mais (7%).  
 
Two-thirds of bananas grown are beer bananas, making beer brewing an important source of 
cash income for Rwandan households. Bart (1993) reports that this income varies between 500 
and 3000 RWF per month, representing on average 50 liters per household per month. For 
owners of large banana fields, this amount can be much higher. In my own calculations with the 
DSA data set , I found that beer sales represent on average 10% of gross household income, the 
equivalent of 5800 RWF per year and totalling 267 liters sold. If we only take the beer selling 
households (78%), average gross beer income is 7500 RWF, representing 13% of gross income.  
 
 
                                                                 
1   Clay, D., Reardon, T., Kangasniemi, J, Sustainable Intensification in the Highland Tropics : Rwandan 
Farmers’ Investments in Land Conservation and Soil Fertility, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
1998, p. 363. 
2  Bart, F., Montagnes d’ Afrique, terres paysannes, le cas du Rwanda, 1993. 
3  Clay, D., Promoting Food Security in Rwanda through sustainable agricultural productivity : meeting the 
challenges of Population pressure, Land Degradation and Poverty, International Development Paper no. 17, 
Michigan State University, Departements of  Agricultural Economics and Economics, chapter 3, p.16.   6 
Table 1: Average gross income and the sources of income (1990), n=1182 
 
Gross income  Sources of income at the household level (in %) 
per household 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
RWF  US$  subsistence  crop sales   beer   livestock  off-farm  transfers 
  cons. of crops  cons.  sales 
55.945  700  54.0  8.6  10.4  3.4  5.1  14.7  3.8 
 
(1)  includes crop consumption from own production 
(2)  includes sales of all crops (food, domestic cash crops and export crops) 
(3)  includes the sales of artisanal brewed beer (banana and sorghum been) 
(4)  includes livestock and livestock products consumed from own production and sold  
(5)  includes income from skilled&unskilled off-farm work and from business activities other than beer sales 
(6)  includes all kinds of gifts of food, beer and livestock received 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from DSA data set. 
 
 
Next to income from beer sales, the average Rwandan household has income from crop 
production for own consumption (54% of gross income), from crop sales (8.6% of gross 
income), from livestock and livestock products 8.5%, from off-farm activities (14.7%) and from 
transfers (3.7%). On average, monetary income - the sum of beer sales, crops sales, livestock 
sales and off-farm income - per household is about 38.9% (8.6+10.4+5.1+14.7) of total gross 
income, some 21.768 RWF per year.  
 
2.2. Land scarcity and population pressure 
 
It is well-known that the average size of the Rwandan farm is very small. In 1984 it was 1.2 ha 
per household and decreased to 0.89 ha per household in 1990. This is a reduction of 25% over 
just 6 years. Since these are averages, it means that many peasants have less then 0.7 ha, the 
generally accepted minimum size needed to feed the average household. Population density in 
Rwanda in 1990 was 300 persons per square kilometer, the highest in Africa and one of the 
highest in the world.  
 
Kangasniema (1998) states that economic theory does not have a clearcut answer on the 
relationship between agriculture and commercialization under population pressure. On the one 
hand, declining farm size pushes farmers to cultivate and sell crops that have high returns per   7 
acre of land and to buy those crops that have only low returns to the scarce resource.
4 On the 
other hand, the existence of transaction and transportation costs and the associated failures in 
the markets for food and other products may make  households subsistence-oriented. Only 
empirical research can find out what farmers actually do. 
 
Farms are not only small in Rwanda, but also highly fragmented. Blarel a.o (1992), using a 1987-
1988 World Bank Survey data set of 232 households, found that 40% of  farms have 8 or more 
parcels. In their regressions however, neither farm size nor farm fragmentation seem to have a 
negative effect on land  productivity.
5 Place and Hazell (1993), using the same World Bank data 
set, found that Rwandan peasants invest – defined as short term improvements (continued 
mulching or manuring) or long term improvements (planting trees, trenching, destumping or 
green fencing) – more in land when they have secure rights on their land.
6 But this does not 
mean that yields on these fields are higher. Place and Hazell at least did not find a productivity 
increasing effect of land rights. They point out that other constraints can be more binding such 
as technology , credit and fertilizer.  
 
The findings of both Blarel a.o and Place and Hazell are not confirmed in a study by Byiringiro 
and Reardon (1996) who used a much larger (nationally representative) 1990-1991 data set of 
1248 rural households. They find a strong inverse relationship between farm size and land 
productivity and a positive relationship between farm size and labor productivity.
7 Small farms 
invest twice as much per hectare in soil conservation compared to large farms. Byiringiro and 
Reardon show that erosion severely reduces farm yields in Rwanda. 
 
Several reports published by a research team from Michigan State University show a clear and 
dramatic decline in yields of all major crops between 1984 and 1991. As a result of this decline 
and of population growth, per capita food production dropped by 25%. Half of the farmers in 
the DSA data set report declining productivity. The fact that 1984 was considered to be a modest 
                                                                 
4  Kangasniemi, J., People and Bananas on steep slopes : Agricultural Intensification and Food Security under 
Demographic Pressure and Environmental Degradation in Rwanda, Ph.D Disseration, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, 1998, p.127. 
5  Blarel, B.,Hazell, P., Place, F., Quiggin, J., The Economics of Farm Fragmentation : Evidence from Ghana 
and Rwanda, The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 6, no. 2, p. 252. 
6  Place, F and Hazell, P, Productivity effects of Indigenous Land Tenure Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, February 1993, p.14-15. 
7  Byiringiro, F. and Reardon, T., Farm Productivity in Rwanda : the effects of farm size, erosion, and soil 
conservation investments, Agricultural Economics 15, 1996, p. 132-135.   8 
drought year suggests that the observed decline in production between 1984 and 1989-1991 was 
real.
8 The report also states that the decline for tubers, the main providers of calories for the 
poor, is particularly strong. Half of Rwanda’s farmland suffers from moderate to severe erosion. 
Regional differences are outspoken : the Northwest (Gisenyi prefecture) agroecological zone 
produces twice as much output per unit of land as the Southwest (Gikongoro and Cyangugu 
prefecture).  
 
The driving force behind declining land productivity, soil erosion and declining per capita 
incomes is population growth. Peasants are forced to cultivate marginal unfertile lands, often on 
steep hill sides. Boserup (1965) has argued that agricultural innovation is spurred by decreasing 
productivity. She argues that as land becomes scarcer, peasants will adopt shorter fallow periods, 
apply more fertilizer and work the land more intensively. This process will allow the peasantry to 
avoid the malthusian trap over population growth and hunger.  
 
From a survey of 14 case studies, Wiggins (1995) has concluded that that the Boserupean model 
of population-induced agricultural intensification is a correct representation of evolving realities 
in the African countryside.
9 He argues a.o. that farmers have seized opportunities to grow new 
crops as marketing becomes more attractive as a result of better roads. Platteau (2000) however 
considers this picture too optimistic and points at several constraining factors, especially at the 
technological level.
10 He argues that intensification has proceeded at a very slow pace relative to 
population growth, in spite of improved access to markets. Interestingly, Platteau considers 
Rwanda a perfect illustration of this distressing possibility :  
«  Population growth has reached extemely high levels without giving rise to major technical progress 
susceptible of providing a decent livelihood to the growing number of peope living on the land. » 
 
 
2.3. Food crops, coffee and banana beer 
 
The effect of population pressure on crop choices and land use in Rwanda has been analysed by 
Kangasniemi (1998). Using the 1989-1991 nationally representative farm household survey I will 
also use, he finds that Rwandan farmers prefer to keep and even expand their banana holdings. 
                                                                 
8  Clay, D. et al., Promoting Food Security in Rwanda, ibidem, Michigan State University, chapter 3, p. 34. 
9  Wiggins, S.Changes in African Farming Systems between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, Journal of   
      International Development, vol.7, n°6 ,1995, pp.807-848   9 
In fact, under population pressure, farmers prefer to grow bananas, brew and sell banana beer. 
With the money, the farmers buy food crops and finance other expenditures. Bananas are 
popular because they are not only a source of monetary income, they also provide income the 
whole year round, a significant difference with e.g. coffee. Bart (1993) writes that banana 
cultivation is not labour-intensive, is socially very important and provides protective cover 
against erosion. All these factors combine to make bananas the most important and most 
preferred crop for  Rwandan peasants. Clay et al. (1995) add that the farming practises needed 
for higher yields require more labor then other crops. The brewing activity of course is also 
labor-intensive.  
 
Kangasiemi (1998) argues that the exchange strategy (production of banana beer for 
consumption of beans) is the preffered strategy by the Rwandan farmer to cope with population 
pressure : 
« Multivariate analysis that controls for agroclimatic and other factors shows that in Rwanda’s banana 
zone, households with less land per adult equivalent sell more beer bananas per hectare. In this respect 
bananas are different from any other major crop, including coffee. This suggests that Rwandan farmers are 
not substituting food crops for cash crops to cope with land scarcity caused by population growth. While 
households with less land per person are not making any dramatic transition to cash crops either, they 
clearly prefer to keep their bananas and to rely on the exchange of banana beer for food. ‘ Food first’ is not 
their strategy of achieving food security. » (p.133) 
 
The main argument in support of the economic rationale behind the exchange strategy is simple : 
it can be computed that the cash revenue from a hectare of beer bananas sold as beer would on 
average have bought 1446 kilogram of beans (Kangasniema, p.157). This is 72% more than the 
estimated average national bean yield. This shows that, at the relative prices and yields that 
prevailed in 1990, the strategy of exchanging banana beer for beans succeeds in substituting 
labor for land and in improves the food entitlements of those engaged in the exchange strategy.  
 
The importance of the brewing of banana beer is such that 80% of Rwanda’s rural households  
get more cash from bananas than from coffee or any other sigle crop, and that, for 41% of the 
households, bananas are a more important source of cash than all other crops combined.  
 
Clay et al. (1995) report that sweet potatoes are the single most important source of calories for 
Rwandans. Sweet potatoes have more calories per-kilogram than potatoes or cooking bananas. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
10  Platteau, J.Ph., Institutions, Social Norms and Economic Development, Harwood, 2000, ch. 2, p.26.   10 
Except for high-altitude areas, where potatoes grow best, only bananas produce more calories 
per-hectare than sweet potatoes. Sweet potato production is not labor-intensive, compared to 
bananas beer production or potatoes and it is less demanding of soil quality and moisture.  
 
 
2.4. Regional differences in 1990 
 
Table 2 
Prefecture  average  average  monetary*  Altitude  Rain  Distance 
  land size  gross y  income as %  (m)  (mm)  to paved 
  per hh  per hh  of gross y      road (km) 
Ruhengeri  0.79  65.443  40  2115  1124  11 
Butare  0.81  39.134  37  1660  1120  14 
Buymba  1.01  63.702  41  1888  919  17 
Cyangugu  0.66  33.878  41  1917  1567  30 
Gikongoro  0.89  30.376  39  1917  1556  28 
Gisenyi  0.45  51.175  45  1946  1313  9 
Gitarama  0.92  53.828  38  1630  1070  15 
Kibungo  1.35  113.170  37  1469  733  18 
Kibuye  1.16  32.757  33  2100  1275  66 
Kigali  0.95  70.513  38  1581  822  31 
Rwanda  0.89  55.954  39  1802  1126  22 
N=1146     
* Monetary income is the sum of income from crop sales, beer sales, livestock sales and off-farm income. 
 
In terms of gross household income, the southern prefectures of Butare, Gikongoro and the 
eastern prefectures Kibuye and Cyangugu are poorer than the northern, central and western 
prefectures. Compared to Ruhengeri and Kigali prefectures for example, average gross 
household income in the southern prefectures is only half. This has not much to do with the size 
of the farm : farms in Rwanda are very small everywhere (with the possible exception of 
Kibungo prefecture). Regional differences in household income are better explained by soil 
fertility and productivity, suitability of the soil for high yielding crops (such as sweet potatoes in 
the north), access to public infrastructure (such as roads and markets), availability of off-farm 
jobs, the price of coffee and tea for regions growing these crops. We come back to regional 
differences in the next section, where we discuss the food crisis that struck southern Rwanda in 
1989. 
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3. THE FOOD CRISES AND ENTITLEMENT FAILURE OF 1989 
 
3.1. The entitlement to food 
 
 
Farmers will use part of their production of food crops for own consumption. A. Sen calls this 
the direct entitlement of food the farmer has. When the farmer also earns a wage, produces cash 
crops, receives transfers or has another source of income which he can use to buy food, the 
farmer has an exchange entitlement in Sen’s terms. Most farmers have a combination of direct and 
exchange entitlements to food. A farmer producing beans has a direct entitlement to beans. An 
increase in the price of beans will not endanger the direct entitlement of the bean producer. 
Farmers who are not producing beans will see their exchange entitlement to beans decreased 
when,ceteris paribus, the price of beans increases. This allows us to stress the importance of 
relative prices in the conservation of a farmer’s exchange entitlements. As 80% of Rwandan 
peasant households are net buyers of beans, the price of beans is very important.  
 
Taking a look at direct entitlements first, we note that beans, bananas, potatoes and sweet 
potatoes are the major food crops for Rwandans. Bananas are often used to brew beer and thus 
give acces to exchange entitlements. Coffee is an export crop and also gives acces to exchange 
entitlements. In 1989, production of beans and sweet potatoes declined sharply in Gikongoro. 
Since sweet potatoes are the most important crop in Gikongoro (in contrast to Rwanda as a 
whole were bananas are the most important crop), this decline caused a severe loss of direct 
entitlement to food. Together with the production of sweet potatoes, the production of beans 
declined as well with 50 % in both seasons (see figure 2). Importantly, both figures 1 and 2 show 
that the production decline in 1989 was a local and not a country-wide phenomenon. The value 
of production in Rwanda declined gradually over the years (as did the quantity of bananas 
produced), but there was no sudden decline in 1989. That yeat even shows a upsurge in the 
national value of production. 
 
In contrast to direct entitlment failures, which can occur as a result of bad weather, rain, crop 
disease, drought or other calamnities, exchange entitlement failures depend on relative prices and 
thus on market forces. The entitlement approach focusses on starvation and not on famine   12 
mortality. People starve when they cannot command enough food. As Sen indicates, many 
famine deaths are the result of epidemics, but this is not of our interest here. People will more 
easily become victim of sickness or desease when they lack adequate food consumption. The 
command over food a peasant has, by means of his direct and his exchange entitlements over 
food is thus at the centre of our attention. The production decline in seasons 1989a and especially 1989b 
in Gikongoro (and parts of Butare) prefecture (see figure 1) are evidence of direct entitlement failures. This 
affects consumption if households are not able to compensate for this trough purchases of food 
on the market. In the next sections we will see whether exchange entitlement failures were also 
part of the peasant situation. 
 





















source : author’s calculations from DSA dataset 
 
 
Figure 2 : Production of major crops in Rwanda and Gikongoro 
in average kilograms per household per year/season 
 
Production of beans 
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Production of bananas 









   












Production of sweet potatoes 










   



























Legend : full line ____ for Rwanda, dotted line ------ for Gikongoro 
Left-hand graphs are for the first season (October-March), right-hand graphs are 




In order to detail the relative importance of different f ood items consumed by Rwandan 
households, we look at table 3. It is shown that, in terms of value, beans , bananas and sweet 
potatoes were the most important crops in the Rwandan diet in 1990. Together they constitued 
67% of the average crop consumption per month in the 1990a season. Very few meat is   14 
consumed, wheras large quantities of banana beer were consumed. The later took 20% of total 
consumption in Rwanda, 15% in Gikongoro and 7% in Ruhengeri. Table 3 also shows other 
regional differences, in particular the importance of potatoes in the Ruhengeri diet and sweet 





Table 3: Consumption data per household per month (season 1990a)* 
 
  Rwanda  Gikongoro  Ruhengeri 
Crops  kg  value  %  kg  value  %  kg   value  % 
 
Beans  21.96  869.62  26  8.54  354.59  22  24.36  946.04  25 
Potatoes  16.85  282.74    8  8.89  155.71    9  59.55  833.82  22 
Peas  0.99  49.50  1  1.33  66.56  4  1.58  79.11  2 
Mais  12.69  288.82  9  4.07  92.67  6  18.52  421.69  11 
Manioc  16.43  281.45  8  3.70  67.32  4  3.30  71.14  2 
Bananas  42.14  715.54  21  2.17  39.87  2  15.16  290.73  8 
Sweet potatoes  46.70  683.22  20  51.27  726.33  44  46.08  629.80  16 
Sorghum  6.37  190.54  6  4.84  141.40  9  19.05  549.55  14 
 
Total of 8 crops    3360.9      1644.4      3821.8 
   
Meat    181.3      69.76      207.16   
      (48.7)**           (67.7)**          (42.1)** 
 
Banana beer (liter)  28.22  889.05    9.73  311.38    10.63  340.41 
      (15.6)***          (20.9)***         (30.1)*** 
 
Adult equivalents  4.90  4.59  5.09 
Consumption of 8 crops,  904.33  441.29  858.42 
meat and beer per ae  
per month 
 
*  quantities are the sum of production in season 1990a minus kg sold and given to others plus kg bought and 
received from others. Prices are average market prices in RWF per kg in season 1990a for Rwanda and in 
the prefectures of Gikongoro and Ruhengeri. Percentages is the percent of the total value of 8 crops. 
**  % households with no meat consumption 
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3.2 Some Exchange entitlements
11 
 
3.2.1 Coffee versus beans  
 
Export crops are another way to secure one’s living in a peasant economy. In Rwanda, peasants 
had three main ways to earn some monetary income : selling crops on the market , brewing beer 
or performing off-farm labor. Now, we concentrate on the export crop, coffee.  Table 4 shows 
the evolution of coffee cultivation over several years. For the whole of Rwanda, about half of the 
peasants were cultivating coffee in 1989. On average, they held about 150 coffee trees. Over 
three years, this number stayed about the same, but the income from coffee dropped by one 
third. The regional differences (not in the table) are sharp : households in Gikongoro doubled 
their number of trees between 1989 and 1991 only to end up in 1991 with half of the coffee 
income compared to 1989. Wether this investment strategy was the right one, remains to be 
discussed. Altough peasant investment behaviour is not the main topic of this chapter, we need 
to look at the value of coffee in relation to other crops in section (5.1.2) of this chapter. The 
hopes of  ‘a good coffee harvest ’ expressed by farmers in discussions with NGOs on the crisis, 
however have not come out. In Butare, coffee income also dropped sharply over three years 
time, but peasants did not invest in new coffee trees.  
 
Table 4 : Coffee production over several years, household level averages 
 
    1989  1990  1991  89-91% 
 % households doing coffee  46.7 
number of coffee trees  149  155  154  +3.3 
kg sold    48.3  48.4  34.1  -29.3 
coffee income (RWF)  6038  4846  3932  -34.8 
 
 
Coffee was Rwanda’s most important export crop and was responsible for high state revenue in 
the late seventies (see chapter 2). For the farmer, coffee is a source of monetary income. As long 
as the producer price of coffee is high, the farmer has an economic incentive to grow coffee. 
                                                                 
11 We deal with coffee and livestock in this section. For Rwanda as a whole, the exchange entitlement of banana 
beer is important as well, but coffee and livestock are more important than bananas in Gikongoro. In addition, 
famine researchers also study the exchange entitlement of the agricultural wage. However, I only have data on 
wages from the 1990 and 1991 seasons and thus not during the crop failure season. Wage data from 1990 and 
1991 do not show entitlement failures for wage earners.   16 
When that price decreases, he may want to replace coffee with other crops. Bananas and beans 
are the major competitors of coffee for land allocation in the peasant household. By decree, 
coffee trees may not be intercropped, neglected, abandoned or destroyed. As can be observed 
from figure 3, the price of coffee was fixed by the government, first at 122.5, then 125, then 100 
and later at 115. The relative price of coffee versus beans (indexed) however has schown a severe 
decline between 1986 and 1993. Where 1kg of coffee would buy the farmer 1kg of beans in 
1986, the farmer needed 3kg of coffee for 1kg of beans at the end of 1993. It is not surprising 
then, that towards the end of the eighties, farmers started ripping out coffee trees, an act 
forbidden by penal law. Table 4 on coffee production already showed that the average coffee 
income in Rwanda decreased by 1/3 in the course of 3 years (1989-1991). This general decline 
was due to decreased production per tree, but masked big differences between prefectures. 
Gikongoro prefecture is a case in point : average coffee income decreased by 50% , but the 
number of trees had more then doubled in the 1989-1991 period. This means that Gikongoro 
farmers had invested heavily in new trees, which only bear fruit after three years.
12 From the 
scarce but relevant literature on hunger in Gikongoro in 1989, we retain that peasants tell 
investigators that they will starve next season when the next coffee harvest fails :  




As for the famine months of the 1989b season, coffee farmers in Gikongoro and in the whole of 
Rwanda experienced a sharp exchange entitlement failure versus beans. The 1989b price shock 
of beans and the (subsequent) loss of exchange entitlement however was only the beginning of a 
more serious decline of exchange entitlements in the 1991a season and thereafter The price of 












                                                                 
12  These investment figures are analysed in detail in the chapter 2, where I discuss the data on the coffee 
economy. 
13  Les Retombées de la Famine dans les Préfectures de Butare et de Gikongoro, Bureau Social Urbain, Caritas, 
Kigali, Février 1990, p. 17.   17 
Figure 3: The price and the exchange entitlement of coffee 
 






















































































































3.2.2 Livestock versus beans 
 
Table 5: Average livestock holdings over several years, in TLU ’s (*) 
 
                                                                            % change               %households without livestock 
  1989  1990  1991  89-91  89  90  91 
Ruhengeri  0.82  0.84  0.79  -3.6  20.3  17.1  26.0 
Butare  1.19  0.88  1.06  -10.9  36.6   44.8  49.0 
Byumba  1.04  0.95  0.93  -10.5  35.5   39.1  47.3 
Cyangugu  0.31  0.32  0.20  -35.4  42.7  53.9  58.4 
Gikongoro  0.84  0.78  0.65  -22.6  24.7  39.3  43.8 
Gisenyi  0.83  0.87  0.76  -8.4  32.8  35.3  35.3 
Gitarama  0.97  0.94  0.97   0.0  40.8   44.9  46.9 
Kibungo  0.77  0.79  0.78  +1.3  30.4  28.3  21.7 
Kibuye  1.24  1.21  1.29  +4.0  22.1  25.6  27.9 
Kigali  0.93  0.94  1.02  +9.6  30.1  23.1  26.6 
 
Rwanda  0.91  0.86  0.86  -5.4  32.0  35.1  38.4 
 
(*)  Tropical livestock units for Rwanda are calculated as cattle 1; pig 0.25; goat 0.17; sheep 0.17;  
  1140 other hh were surveyed in three rounds 1989-1991. 
 
 
Table 5 shows that Rwandan households, on average, have decreased their livestock holdings 
during the three years of the survey. During this period, household livestock holdings (in tlu’s) 
declined on average by 5.4%. The decline in the southern prefectures, Gikongoro and Cyangugu 
was much larger than in other prefectures. Gikongoro prefecture has the highest percentage of 
households who lost all livestock between 1989 and 1991, namely an increase of 77% of   18 
households without livestock (the Rwandan average being 20% increase). Kibungo, Kibuye and 
Kigali prefectures on the other hand have seen an increase in the number of households holding 
livestock over this period.. 
 
With incomplete risk markets  - entailing interdependence of production and consumption 
decisions – a production input such as livestock can be an important asset which helps protect 
the consumption of poor people (Ravalllion, 1997, p.1223).  It is known from other countries 
that the value of livestock decreases in periods of famines. Sen for example, writing on the 
Ethiopian famine (1972-1974) says that the economic distress of the pastoralists was not 
confined only to the loss of animals (by drought or displacement from traditional grazing land) ,  
 
«The exchange entitlement associated with any given stock of animals vis-à-vis grains also fell sharply. It is 
sometimes overlooked that a pastoralist does not live only by eating animals or consuming animal products 




We only have observations on the price of sheep and goats from October 1989 to September 
1991, thus missing the high point of the famine in Gikongoro. From figure 4 however, we retain 
that holders of goats and sheep in Gikongoro got less value for their livestock in terms of beans 
compared to the Rwandan average. As we have stated several times, the 1989-1991 period is a 
time of prolonged agricultural crisis in Gikongoro and the livestock data may well be an 
indication of this. As crops fail because of drougth, lack of inputs or plant diseases, peasants are 
forced to eat or sell (parts of) their livestock in order to survive. When crop failure is a covariate 
shock (as opposed to an ideosyncratic one), many households sell livestock at the same time, 
thereby causing a sharp decline in the market price of livestock (Ravaillion, 1997, p.1223). From 
the livestock data, we cannot say that livestock owners experienced a sharp exchange entitlement 










                                                                 
14  Sen, A., Poverty and Famines, 1981, p. 105.   19 
 
















































































































We conclude from this section that coffee producers experienced an exchange entitlement 
failure relative to beans in the period of the food crisis. This came on top of a direct entitlement 
failure. The price of coffee continued to decline after 1989, making the exchange rate of beans 
versus coffee not particularly low in 1989 compared to other years. In general, what we observe 
is in fact very close to Sen's observations on the Ethiopian famine (1972-1973). Sen observed 
that the peasant population in Wollo starved to death without substantial rise in food prices.
15 
The peasants experienced a direct entitlement failure and could not command food at the market 
by lack of purchasing power. As Amartya Sen (p. 101) writes 
«The biggest group of destitutes in the Wollo famine came from the agricultural background, and indeed 
were farmers – both tenants and small land-owning cultivators. The entitlement decline here took the form 
of direct entitlement failure without involving the market in the immediate context. The output – typically 
of foodgrains – was severely reduced, and this led to starvation in a direct way. In so far as the Ethiopian 
farmer eats the food grown by the family without becoming involved in exchange to acquire food, the 
immediate influence affecting starvation is the decline of the food grown and owned by the family, rather 
than the fall in the total food output in the region as a whole. The distinction is important, since the Food-
Availability-Decline-approach would focus on the latter variable. The hunger of the Wollo peasant had a 
more direct origin. 
But, of course, once his own crop had failed, the Wollo peasant would have tried to get hold of food trough 
the market in so far as he could have exercised market command. But since the agricultural failure also 
amounts to a collapse of his source of market command (namely his income), he was not in a position to 
supplement his reduced food output by market purchase. The Wollo agriculturalist could not provide much 
effective demand for food in the market, and despite widespread starvation the food prices in Dessie and 
elsewhere recorded very little increase.»  
 
                                                                 
15  Sen, p. 69.   20 
As for peasants in Gikongoro, crop production of the household farm is indeed the major 
source of the household income (up to 70%) and household consumption. Only off-farm labour 
(which is in short supply) and the sale of livestock products are sources of purchasing power that 
are independent of agricultural output. The sale of beer (which depends on the supply of 
bananas and sorghum) and crops on the market is not independent of agricultural output. High 
bean prices in the beginning of the 1989b season (April-June 1989), can therefore be an 
indication that households still had some cash to command food in the market. The absence of 
(very) high bean prices in subsequent seasons (1990-1994) therefore may then be an indication 
that households on the one hand produced more beans themselves and on the other hand had 




4. THE CAUSES OF FAMINE IN SOUTHERN RWANDA 
 
4.1. Food import and export policy 
 
The central political idea concerning agriculture and indeed the central issue of Habyarimana’s 
regime was food self-sufficiency. In numerous speeches the president stressed the importance of 
food self-sufficiency. This had to be reached by increased agricultural production. In a 1984 
speech before heads of state of Africa and France, in Bujumbura, Habyarimana expressed this as 
follows :  
“In Rwanda, food self-sufficiency has always been the primary objective of our development effort. Given the 
periodic famines which regurlarly afflicted us in the past, our population density considered the highest in 
Africa, and our extreme shortage of arable land, we have had no option but to intensify food production. 
Living constantly at the very edge of subsistance, the Rwandan peasants has had no other choice, and 
desired no other choice than to dedicate his efforts to increasing the production of food…” 
16 
 
We remark that the vision of Habyarimana concerning the choices and the preferences of 
peasants as far as crop production is concerned, is completely opposite to empirical research 
findings by Kangasniemi (1998) as we reported in section (2.3) of this chapter. 
 
                                                                 
16  World Bank, Rwanda, Agricultural Strategy Review, 1991, p.12.   21 
Every four years, a general development plan was presented in which nation-wide production 
targets for the main crops were outlined and where the problems to increase production were 
addressed. For Habyarimana, the main method to increase production was to work more and to 
work harder. In economist’s terms, to apply more labour to the land. In a 1987 speech 
Habyarimana said that his policy of food self-sufficiency should not be equated with autarky. He 
said he realized that Rwanda could not produce all the food it needed. 
17 But, in stead of food 
imports, it was better to rely on food aid, Habyarimana said. The latter namely does not bring the 
balance of payment out of equilibrium. Food aid, he added, should be sold above the price of 
locally produced crops, in order not to reduce the production incentives of the peasants.  
 
In a 1991 report (p.12) on Rwanda’s agricultural strategy, the World Bank writes that 
“The Second Republic has been characterized by the vision of an inward-looking, non-importing, 
autonomous approach to food self-sufficiency, at both the national and the farm level. In the case of the 
latter, subsistence rather than market production has usually been encouraged. “ 
 
Although the Habyarimana regime embraced the vision of a self-sufficient agrarian nation, 
Rwanda was far from self-sufficient. In a June 1989 report, an official of the Ministry of 
Agriculture published the results of a small survey of informal border trade conducted in April 
and May 1989. He shows that Rwanda appears to export substantial manufacturing goods, 
potatoes small-stock, poultry and vegetables to the surrounding countries, and that it is at the 
same time an important importer of cooking oil, beans, sorghum, bananas, sugar and maize. 
18  
This survey can be complemented with official trade statistics. Table 6 shows that Rwanda 
imported food for a average annual value of 40 million US dollar during the eighties. Rwanda 







                                                                 
17  Habyarimana, J, Discourse at the first encounter with public servants, January 30, 1987. 
18  Ngirumwami, J.L., Ministry of Agriculture, Résultats de l‘enquête Commerce Frontalier au Rwanda, June 
1989. No case of re-export was found by the author, indicating that all import was meant for domestic 
consumption.   22 
Table 6 : Value of Food Imports and Exports in million US dollar* 
 
  Imports  Exports 
1981  37,3  67,4 
1982  42,8  69,3 
1983  37,4  60,6 
1984  48,5  62,9 
1985  63,3  68,7 
1986  53,4  160,1 
1987  38,5  121,5 
1988  36,8  91,2 
1989  41,0  104,7 
1990  46,7  88,6 
 
* Source : UCTAD Trade Statistics, 1992 yearbook. 
 
 
These results indicate two things : first, the vision of the Rwandan leadership did not correspond 
with reality : Rwandan agriculture was not self-sufficient, there was a large volume of cross 
border trade. Second, trade continued at the time of the crop failure, meaning that there was no 
nationwide shortfall in agricultural production, as documented by the production statistics of the 
rural household survey (see earlier sections). Table 6 shows us even that the value of food export 
doubled in the second half of the eighties, compared to the first half. This remarkable upswing in 
food exports is for the moment  unexplained, but coincides with a sharp decline in export 
earnings from coffee. Food exports could have been used to partly offset the decrease of these 
coffee export earnings. At the same time, imports of food in the second half of the eighties 
remain at the same level as in the first half. These import figures show 1988, the year before the 
crop failure to be the year with the lowest value of food imports in the decade. This has to do 
with the 'name ' that was given to the years 1987 and 1988 by the Habyarimana regime. 1987 was 
called the year of food self-sufficiency and 1988 the year of the protection of the income of the 




According to the Agricultural Strategy Review (World Bank, 1991), it is this informal trade (read 
illegal cross-border trade) that is believed to be responsible for the import of beans that 
                                                                 
19  Gatete, C., Food Security and Food Aid in Rwanda, Wihogora, June 1996, p. 2.   23 
eliminated the food shortage in Southern Rwanda. 
20  “Informal trade” means that under normal 
conditions the imports of crops such as beans, sorghum and bananas are officially banned. A 
division in the Ministry of Commerce was responsible for assessing the needs for imports based 
on a projection of national production and consumption. This division only used data on official 
imports which became available two weeks after arrival in the country. The division does not 
make any projections on consumption or production and does not have information on 
unofficial (informal) imports from neighbouring countries.
21 Nevertheless it is estimated that in 
1986, a fairly good crop year, unofficial imports accounted for 50% of the beans and sorghum 
sold on Rwanda’s markets. If the division anticipates food shortages, a complex process of 
import licensing was set in motion. During the 1989 crop failure, the World Bank writes (1991, 
p.25), the Commerce Ministry decided to authorize ten importers to import beans from Uganda 
when the price had reached 60 RWF. This was a too late to prevent starvation and emigration.  
The reduction and surely the banning of imports of course is detrimental to a farming 
population that, under the pressure of population growth, concentrates efforts on high value 
crops. The exchange strategy (banana beer for beans) that we have discussed earlier on, is only 
viable when beans are in effect imported into Rwanda. In the absence of imports, the exchange 
strategy is useless and farmers have to grow subsistence crops themselves.  
 
As with licensing in general and under famine conditions in particular, large profits and 
speculation from the side of the traders and from the side of the license giving authority are 
possible. Import policy in Rwanda under the Habyarimana regime was managed by S.  
Rwabukumba, member of the Akazu and brother of Agathe Kanziga, the wife of the president. 
He headed the powerful company ‘ La Centrale ‘ which was in charge of official import into 
Rwanda.  At the same time this person, who had not even finished his secondary school, was in 
charge of the foreign currency division of the National Bank. Since import cannot occur without 
foreign currency, Rwabukumba sat in a key position. ' La Centrale ' did not import basic foods 
needed by the Rwandan population, but imported high quality products for the Rwandan elite. 
Well-informed people knew that ‘ La Centrale ‘ did not pay import or export taxes.
22 Both the 
                                                                 
20  World Bank, Ibidem, p. 26. 
21  World Bank, Ibidem, p. 25. 
22  Reyntjens, F., Testimony, Cour d’ Assisen, Brussels, April 20, 2001.   24 
non-food and food imports for the elite took up a large part of the foreign currency. As Bézy 
argues, the food that was imported was destined for:
23 
 
-  the expatriates from industrialized countries, to allow them to continue their food habits 
-  the growing number of tourists 
-  interns in schools who benefited from non-traditional food 
-  the national elite who lived a european-style of live 
-  the whole of the urban population (5%) who had introduced milk powder, tomato 
concentrate, imported cooking oil, far , sugar and rice (whose domestic production remained 
too low) into its eating habits. 
 
Reading the 1987 speech of Habyarimana in which he pleaded for import restriction, one gets 
the impression that the Rwandan peasantry had to produce more food in order for the Rwandan 
elite to continue its import of luxury products, both food and non-food. Indeed, each dollar that 
is saved on import of basic foods can be used for something else. Additional information, found 
in numerous articles of the journal Kinyamateka, seems to validate this statement : between June 
1989 and December 1989, Kinyamateka published several articles in which they revealed that 
government authorities embezzled public funds on a large scale. A.Sibomana, priest and editor of 
Kinyamateka put it this way :  
«  Rwanda was a country which still had the reputation of being well run, ruled by a sort of ‘enlightened 
despot’, Juvénal Habyarimana. But you don’t become an honest man just by knowing how to quote French 
poetry to President Mitterrand. Juvénal Habyarimana and his people were plundering the country while the 
peasants were starving. We had evidence that he or his wife were diverting funds allocated to buying food for 
the population to import luxury items instead, for example televisions which were sold at vastly inflated 




4.2. A malfunctioning food marketing system 
 
Accroding to Pottier (1993), OPROVIA, the leading Rwandan agency in food marketing, 
intervened only to a limited scale in food markets.
25 It was OPROVIA’s task to assure price 
stability, especially for beans and sorghum. The Rwandan government however expected that 
OPROVIA could be run as a profitable business, which was not possible when OPROVIA had 
to buy surpluses in the post-harvest period above the market price and sell from its stocks in any 
                                                                 
23  Bézy, F., Bilan d'un régime, 1962-1989, Louvain-La-Neuve, 1990, p. 13. The author also refers to J. 
Nzisabira, dans Bulletin des Séances, ARSOM, XXXIV, n° 4, 1987, p. 641. 
24  Sibomana, A., Hope for Rwanda, p. 25.   25 
hungry period below the market price. According to Pottier, OPROVIA’s struggle became acute 
following the bad harvests from 1988 and the drought in 1989 :  
“The impact of the 1988 harvest failures, caused by excessive rainfall, was unusually harsh since the 
authorities had banned all food imports that year; 1988 being Rwanda’s Année de l’ Autosuffisance !”
26 
 
In fact, as we earlier saw, 1987 was decreed to be the year of food self-sufficiency, not 1988. But 
this does not make a big difference. Food imports were low in either year, since the president 
wanted to keep the balance of payments under control. One could say that Habyarimana was a 
conservative and parsimonious accountant. The 1988 slogan was «the year of the defense of the 
peasant income». For 1989, the slogan was «The year of rural self-organisation». The latter 
meaning that the peasants should not wait until the administration comes to help them, but take 
matters into their own hands.  
 
According to Pottier, it is exactly the policy of food import minimization that made it impossible 
for Rwanda to re-supply its food stocks at the time of the 1988 bad harvest. This is one reason 
why, one year later in 1989, food stocks where almost empty. Official inquiries revealed that the 
Rwandan Government was setting OPROVIA an impossible task. OPROVIA’s impasse, Pottier 
writes, was proof that no real progress had been made since the drawing up of agreements with 
the EC in 1982. The second report of the Interservice Commission warned, with regard to 
Rwanda’s internal food trade :  
 
«I has been noted that even when food is abundant, the shops and silos belonging to the cooperatives and 
communes remain poorly stocked, even though these structures are theoretically the most appropriate for 
supplying all of the country’s communes. It is therefor a matter of urgency that all the serivices concerned 
(ministeries , OPROVIA and agricultural projects) to decide how best the decentralized stockage system 
could be activated in the interest of a nationwide distribution of foodstuffs »
27 
 
The government of Rwanda nevertheless continued to believe that OPROVIA will take the 
initiative for inter-regional food commerce. (Rapport, p.23) The expectation, Pottier argues, that 
OPROVIA could raise the funds required for effective inter-regional distribution of surpluses in 
times of crisis is unrealistic. In fact, the contrary was true, there were signs of gross neglect 
towards the very apparatus for state-controlled marketing :  
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
25  Pottier, J., Taking stock, Food Marketing reform in Rwanda 1982-1989, African Affairs, p. 6 and p. 15. 
26  Pottier, J., ibidem, p. 15. During the Habyarimana regime, every year was given a slogan. 1988 was called 
the year of food self-sufficiency.  
27  Republic of Rwanda, Rapport sur la Situation Alimentaire de notre Pays, Ministry of Agriculture, Octobre 
1989, translation by J.Pottier, ibidem, 1993, p. 20.   26 
«The Rwandan governement still needs to reimburse OPROVIA the promised 28.000.000 RwF it lost 
in 1988 after selling at artificially low prices the sorghum it had bought too dearly in 1986.» 
28 And , 
«The Rwandan government should reajust the agricultural prices at which it bought from OPROVIA in 
1989 to ensure that this organisation in future can reduce the losses it must incure.» 
29 
 
There is also an information problem in the game : one can argue that the population, through 
the speeches of Habayrimana (restriction of import), can start believing that future public stocks 
of grains or other crops will be low and that the government will not be able to intervene in the 
case of a crop failure. This information problem may lead to high expected prices.
30 
 
Relying on this discussion of OPROVIA, we argue that the Rwandan elite never really cared to 
set up a functioning food marketing system. Pottier (1993, p. 27) is right on the mark when he 
writes that 
«It may even be fair to suggest that the slow progress – in food marketing – was yet another illustration of 
how policy makers tend to regard improved nutritional status as the by-product of agricultural strategies 
rather than a goal in its own right.» 
31 
 
This is exactly what we have been saying when discussing the peasant ideology of the 
Habyarimana regime in another paper of the author : the regime considered the peasants as 
producers (of food and coffee), not as consumers.32 The leadership did not equip OPROVIA 
with the means to succesfully secure access to food for the destitute; it did not pay back debts; it 
banned food imports and increased food exports; it professed to secure the income of the 
peasants and considered the application of more labor to agriculture as the solution. 
 
 
4.3. Agricultural policy under Habyarimana 
 
In 1991, the World Bank writes that  
“A localized crop failure like that of 1989 in Butare and Gikongoro brings in train forced emigation 
abroad of several thousand, a large number of children dropping out of school , and deaths from starvation“ 
33.  
                                                                 
28  Republic of Rwanda, Compte-rendu de la Réunion tenue au Minagri en date du 02/05/1989 sur la situation 
alimentaire du Rwanda en Avril 1989, Ministry of Agriculture, p. 4. 
29  Republic of Rwanda, Compte-rendu, p. 4. 
30  I refer to Ravallion, M., Markets and Famines, 1987 for an exploration of the price effects of information. 
31  Pottier, ibidem, p. 27. 
32  Verwimp, P., Development ideology and Genocide, Journal of Genocide Research, November 2000. 
33  World Bank, Rwanda Agricultural Strategy Review , 1991, p. 1.   27 
 
The direct cause of this crop failure was a severe drought in Southern Rwanda. A prolonged 
period of drought had started in 1984 and reached its climax in 1989. Rwandan peasants have 
developed capacities to deal with food crisises. The Gikongoro population however was already 
very poor and vulnerable to adverse schocks. In 1989, they were at the limits of their resources. 
The incapacity of the peasants to cope with the crop failure were due to the absence of credit, of 
fertilizer, the anti-erosion practices, tax policy and the general neglect of the prefecture. Again, 
these elements are closely linked to explicit policy choices. We discuss them one by one. 
Although peasants contributed vasts amounts of savings to the well-known Banques Populaires, 
very few loans were given to peasants. Half of the loans were given to traders and businessmen 
whereas this group only made up 14% of the people with deposits at these banks. 
34  
 
Under Habyarimana, Rwanda was the country in the world that used the lowest amount of 
fertlizer per capita.
35 Again, this has to do with the import restrictions but also with the 
distribution of the available fertilizer. The regime wanted to restrict its use for industrial crops 
only (tea and coffee). The absence of fertilizer is cited by a peasant in the IWACU film as one 
reason for the incapacity to cope with the crop failure.  
 
The Habyarimana regime undertook a massive and nation-wide anti-erosion effort. The regime 
obliged all peasants to dig ditches on their plots. Ditches were considered the best means of 
combating erosion. Peasants who refused to do this were fined, just as in the case of neglect of 
the coffee trees. Guichaoua (1991) who interviewed farmers i n 1989, reports that farmers 
resented the harsh labour requested in the nationwide ant-erosion policy of digging ditches. No 
doubt erosion was one of the main problems of the country given that peasants have to cultivate 
the slopes of hills. However, as Kangasniemi (1998, p.174) writes, Rwanda’s anti-erosion 
campaign was rigid and simplistic, leaving no room for local physical conditions (rainfall, soil 
type, slope) indigenous practices, and household specific economic circumstances (crops, 
livestock). 
 
A B elgian brother in the north of Rwanda, specializing in agriculture had developed an 
alternative way of combating erosion. He taught the peasants to construct radical terraces. When 
                                                                 
34  I refer to Uvin and to IFAD for this.   28 
the author visited the brother in his home in Byumba in August 2000, a very large area was 
covered with radical terraces. During the interview the brother related his story :  
«From the beginning of his arrival in Rwanda (1972) I  believed that intensive agriculture was thé 
solution to the countries problem. Government policy under the Habyarimana regime however was build 
on extensive agriculture. The government believed that production would increase if all available land 
would be taken under cultivation. In order to prevent erosion on the hills, the regime obliged the 
population to dig ditches, which was very unpopular among the peasants and which did not work. From 
1977 onwards I  practised radical terracing on 10 ha of land. Donors and engineers showed some 
enthusiasm but the Ministry of Agriculture remained sceptic. In 1985 Habyarimana visited the project in 
Byumba and was delighted by the results. However, he remained silent upon my requests to implement 
my techniques on a larger scale. My fields were namely more productive then the fields without radical 
terracing. In 1987, I   wrote a very critical report on the functioning of the communal agricultural 
officials ( they were doing nothing but commanding and bully the peasants). I believes that Habyarimana 
saw the report because from 1988 onwards the president himself encouraged peasants to adopt radical 
terracing in his speeches.«
36  
 
The brother did not have to oblige the peasants to adopt radical terracing, they came to him to 
learn the technique by themselves.
37 The contrast with the mandatory erosion techniques decreed 
by the regime could not be greater : upon the beginning of the democratisation process (1989-
1990) and the decrease in power of the MRND, peasants neglected the maintenance of the anti-
erosion ditches or destroyed the ditches.
38 This also resembles the treatment of the coffee trees. 
Peasants started to rip them out, even before 1991, although this was prohibited by law.  
 
While the absence of credit and fertilizer, the mandatory coffee cultivation, the umuganda policy 
and the anti-erosion measures where not confined to the prefecture of Gikongoro (indeed they 
were nation-wide policies), their cumulated effect may exhaust a population that is on average 
poorer than in other prefectures. While peasants all over Rwanda suffer from mismanagement 
and bad policies, it are always the poor who are hit most. Under normal weather conditions, a 
poor population may just be able to survive despite bad government policies. The occurance of a 
drought may unveil their vulnerability to crop failure and famine.  
 
In line with Habyarimana’s ideology of a hard working and moral peasant population (discussed 
in the first part of the disseration) , Habyarimana tried to reduce the production of beer bananas 
and the consumption of banana beer. It is worth noting that Habyarimana discouraged the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
35  World Bank, Rwanda, Agricultural Strategy Review, 1991, p. 
36  Interview in Byumba, September 6, 2000. This text is a summary of the part of the interview that discussed 
agriculture. 
37  This means that, according to the Belgian Brother, farmers in Byumba adopted radical terracing. Nduwayezu 
(1990) in contrast, writes that no Rwandan farmer adopted radical terracing. For several reasons, the 
brothers’ testimony is much more credible than Nduwayezu’s affirmation.   29 
cultivation of bananas, even though bananas produce a very high yield per acre, and despite the 
fact that a large domestic banana market existed in Rwanda.
39 In a 1979 speech, he is very explicit 
about that:  
 
“Despite the opposition and the misunderstanding that I have seen in this question, I remain convinced that 
the extension of the wine banana and, in certain regions, the appropriation of land for its cultivation, are a 
great handicap for development and for the food equilibrium of the population. The “myth of the banana 




The regime considered beer drinking anti-social and beer brewing wasteful (Kangasniemi, 1998, 
p.142). For the farmer household however, as we have seen in section two, beer brewing and 
selling is very important for food security. Pottier (1992) writes that Habyarimana wanted to 
reduce the cultivation of bananas because he believed occult rituals were being performed in the 
banana plantations. A more economic and down-to-earth approach however, suggests that 
bananas are a direct competitor to coffee, a cash crop that was strongly promoted by the regime.  
 
Habyarimana’s main argument for high food prices was the protection of peasant revenue. While 
that argument made sense from a producers' point of view, it is nonsense once you acknowledge 
that the majority of the population were net-buyers (as opposed to net-sellers) of beans and 
other staple food. Because the Habyarimana regime only looked at the peasantry as producers of 
food and of cash crops, it never acknowledged that many peasants were net-buyers of beans (and 
of food in general).  Net-buyers depend on the price of food for their survival and it does not 
need to be stressed that they benefit from low instead of high bean prices. The policy of import 
restriction was continued in 1988 "to preserve the income of the peasant ". 
 
In that respect, it needs to be said that an agricultural policy of food-selfsufficiency at the 
national, regional, local and household level is, among other things, an anti-pastoral policy. As 
Amartya Sen has argued before, pastoralists do not live of their cattle alone. They engage in 
trade, they exchange cattle products for food crops. If you want every family to grow all the food 
it needs for its own consumption at its own farm, a pastoral way of life is impossible. Pastoralists 
namely do not cultivate. To repeat an expression by G.Kayibanda : « The Tutsi must also cultivate « . 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
38  Ntezilyayo, A., L'agriculture, une priorité dans la reconstruction nationale in A. Guichaoua, ibidem, p. 324. 
39  Little and Horowitz, ibidem. 
40  Habyarimana, J, Speech at the opening of the 1980 new year, 1979, p.135.   30 
5. CHILD MALNUTRITION : AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Data on child malnutrition in Rwanda 
 
We use data from the 1992 Demographic and Health Survey. 1933 children between 0 and 60 
months were surveyed three times between December 1991 and August 1992. The data include 
antropometrics of child and mother, disease and vaccination information, community health 
infrastructure and use of health care. 858 of these children came from households that were 
included in a agricultural research project undertaken by Michigan State University (the rest of 
the 1933 children came from households who were not part of the agricultural survey). The 
demographic data are panel data (first round in 1991, second and third round in 1992), but the 
collection of economic and agricultural data did not take place in 1992. For that resaon, we are 
only using the 1991 cross-section with demographic, agricultural and economic data. 
 
Table 7 : prefectural averages of antropometric indicators 
 
Prefecures  n = 1933  n = 858 
  n  haz  whz  n  haz  whz 
Ruhengeri  207  -2.18  0.64  100  -2.24  0.73 
Butare  211  -2.04  -0.49  100  -2.38  -0.40 
Byumba  197  -2.21  -0.06  80  -2.40  0.15 
Cyangugu  153  -2.17  0.02  61  -2.56  -0.05 
Gikongoro  122  -2.40  0.17  50  -2.62  0.14  
Gisenyi  223  -1.97  0.06  99  -1.96  0.03 
Gitarama  228  -2.14  -0.05  104  -2.00  -0.13 
Kibungo  182  -1.68  -0.36  89  -1.55  -0.40  
Kibuye  154  -1.77  -0.02  71  -1.62  0.04 
Kigali  256  -1.68  -0.17  104  -1.82  -0.18 
 
Rwanda  1933  -2.00  -0.037  858  -2.07  -0.01 
haz : height for age z-score, whz : weight for height z-score 
 
Table 8: Malnutrition, in percentage, n=1933 
  heigt for age  weigth for height 
z-scores 
above -2 (not malnourished)   47.7  94.4 
-2>x>-3 (moderately malnourished)  27.6  4.4 
below -3 (severely malnourished)  24.7  1.2 
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Height for age and weight for height are generally accepted as good indicators of the nutritional 
status of children.
41 The first is a measure of long-run nutritional status. Children with low height 
compared to their age are stunted which is considered as an indication of chronic malnutrition. 
Growth retardation generally occurs between 6 months and 2 years of age.  
Though a stunted child may have some cath up growth, for the most part, a child whose growth has faltered 
in the first two years of life will be on a different growth trajectory during the rest of his/her life. 
(Alderman, 1993) 
 
52% of the children in our sample are smaller then the ‘ standard ‘ child of the same age. It is 
then no surprise that wasting (low weigth-over-age z-score) is less of a problem in Rwanda. More 
then half of the children are indeed relatively small, meaning that their body has adapted to low 
levels of food intake. Since the body is relatively small, it is easier to have a ‘ normal ‘ weight over 
height observation. The z-score measures the deviation of each antropometric outcome from a 




Figure 5: Height-for-age for 1933 children in Rwanda compared to Gikongoro 
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Figure 5 suggests a negative correlation between age and the height-for-age z-score in Rwanda. 
The older the young child gets, the worse its z-score. For Gikongoro, such a correlation seems not to 
exist.  
                                                                 
41  Thomas, D., Public Policy and anthropometric outcomes in the Côte-d’Ivoire, Journal of Public Economics, 
1996, p. 156.   32 
 
Another way to look at this negative relationship is the following. In Gikongoro Prefecture, 
babies younger than 23 months show a very low z-score, meaning they face a severe degree of 
chronic malnutrition. The price of beans in Gikongoro reached its highest point during the 
month of June in 1989. We consider this month to be the high point of the famine in 
Gikongoro. The first round of the nutrition survey was run in the month of December 1991, 
meaning that 30 months separate the period of the survey from the high point of the famine. We 
add to that the information that babies start to be exposed to food other that mother’s milk from 
the age of six months onwards. From this age onwards they are no longer shielded from price 
variations in the staple food. We split the 1933 children in the sample in two groups, the first 
born before and the second born after the price shock of beans. We then investigate whether the 
observed difference in z-scores for both groups of children between Gikongoro and the other 
prefectures is significant or not. The group that experienced the price shock was at the time of 
the survey 36 months or older. We use three categories of malnutrition, the first having a z-score 
higher then -2, which contains children that are not malnourished. The second category is for 
moderately malnourished children with z-scores between –2 and –3 and the last category is for 
severely malnourished children with z -scores below  –3. I n table 9, we test whether the 
distribution of children over these 3 categories differs significantly between Gikongoro and the 
other prefectures.  
 
Table 9: Distribution of malnutrition 
Age  ha-z-score  Rwanda  Gikongoro 
  #  %  #  % 
< 36 m  above -2  607  55.5  26  38.8 
  -2>x>-3  268  24.5  18  26.7 
  below -3  216  20.0  23  34.5 
 
> 36 m  above -2  307  37.4  21  41.2 
  -2>x>-3  260  31.7  13  25.5 
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Table 9 (con.): Chi-Square tests for Chronic Malnutrition for children <60 months of age 
Age  Value  df  Asymp.Sign. 
  (2-sided) 
< 36 months  Pearson Chi-Square  11.043  2  0.004 
  Number of Valid Cases  1094 
 
> 36 months  Pearson Chi-Square  0.964  2  0.617 
  Number of Valid Cases  821 
 
 
The Chi-Square test in table 9 suggests that the distribution of the z-scores of children above the 
age of 36 months does not differ between Gikongoro and the rest of Rwanda. For children 
below the age of 36 months however, this difference is significant, Gikongoro has much more 
children in category 3 (severely malnourished) than Rwanda as a whole. We did not find a 
significant result for any of the other prefectures. This is new evidence for the observation that 
the 1989 crop failure was not a single-peak famine, but was rather an episode in an enduring 
period of hunger, a period that continued in the early nineties. For many peasant families in 
Gikongoro, the 1989 crop failure was not the end point of a period of drought and hunger, but 
rather the beginning of an even worse period. Given the anthropometric evidence, it appears that 
older c hildren have withstood the crop failure whereas children born after June 1989 in 
Gikongoro suffered the most. The latter had mothers who consumed less food than needed 
during the pregnancies of these children, resulting in lower weight at birth and started of their 
lives under bad food conditions. From figures 1 and 2, we observe that food production in 
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5.2. Explaining children’s nutritional status 
 
Table 10a: Regressions of antropometric indicators for children 
0 to 60 months of age, Height-for-age score is dependent variable, n=820 
 
  Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  Regression 4  
  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  OLS  
Child characteristics 
age of child (in months)  -0.0800 ***  -0.0768 ***  -0.0749 ***  -0.0719 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.0000)  (0.000) 
age squared   0.0008 ***   0.0008 ***   0.00076 ***   0.0007 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.0001)  (0.0003)  (0.000) 
sex  -0.0009  -0.0225  -0.0072   0.0043 
  (0.993)  (0.8441)  (0.9512)  (0.970) 
characteristics of mother 
age   -0.0011   -0.0051  -0.0057  0.0017 
  (0.889)  (0.5523)  (0.5180)  (0.845) 
body mass index   0.0381 *   0.04155 **   0.04375 **  0.03310 
  (0.056)  (0.0525)  (0.0444)  (0.121) 
read and write   0.2240  *  0.1388  0.1137  0.315 ** 
  (0.061)  (0.3082)  (0.4027)  (0.012) 
married   0.547 ***   0.45721 **   0.4452 **  0.508 *** 
  (0.002)  (0.0139)  (0.0190)  (0.007) 
Household characteristics   
Household size  -0.0018  -0.0538  -0.0608 *  -0.0108 
  (0.537)  (0.1541)  (0.0861)  (0.725) 
livestock  (tlu)       IV  -0.0068 
        (0.908) 
farm size (acres)    IV  IV   0.00239 ** 
        (0.017) 
log farm output (FRW)   0.261 ***   0.5841 ***   0.6303 *** 
  (0.002)  (0.0033)  (0.0000) 
distance to health center  -0.00136  -0.00126  -0.00128  -0.0028 * 
  (0.332)  (0.3957)  (0.3989)  (0.079) 
regional dummy variables 
crop failure affected region  -0.300 *    IV  -0.305 
  (0.094)      (0.137) 
civil war affected region  -0.297 *    IV  -0.836 *** 
  (0.034)      (0.006) 
prices 
beans      IV   0.0280 
        (0.281) 
bananas       IV  -0.0673 * 
          (0.060) 
potatoes      IV  -0.132 ** 
        (0.011) 
sweet potatoes      IV  -0.0543 
        (0.214) 
Constant  -4.391 ***  -7.411 ***  -7.831 ***  0.789 
  (0.000)  (0.0002)  (0.0000)  (0.583) 
Adjusted R²   0.147   0.123   0.128   0.140 
N=820   35 
significant at the 10% level ; ** significant at the 5% level ; *** significant at the 1% level 
log farm output is instrumented for in regressions 2 and 3 
 
Variables used in the regressions : 
Age of the child in months and its square; 
Sex 0 for male, 1 for female ; age of the mother in years ; 
Body mass index of the mother is the weight in kilograms divided by the squared height in meters ; 
The read/write and the marriage variables are dummies, with 1 for yes anf 0 for no ; 
The size of the household is the number of household members ; 
Tropical livestock units (tlu’s) 1 for cattle, .25 for pigs, .17 for sheep and goats, .10 for chicken and rabits ; 
The farm size variable is the area of land cultivated by the household ; 
 
The farm output variable in the regressions for Table10a is the log of the average value of agricultural production 
over six seasons, from the 1989a sesaon to the 1991b season ; farm output was measured with constant 1987 prices ; 
70% of all households with children<5y have reported farm output for 6 seasons. Households from the remaining 
30% were included when at least 3 seasons were reported. 
 
The regional dummies are 1 for the region affected by the crop failure (Gikongoro and parts of Butare) and for the 
region affected by the civil war (Ruhengeri and Byumba). 
The price variables are average, deflated prices over six seasons for beans, bananas and potatoes in Table10a and 
average deflated prices in the child’s crucial growth period in Table10b. 
 
Discussion of the results 
In previous sections of this chapter, I have documented two facts :  
(1) Gikongoro experienced a sharp decline in farm production in 1989, a decline from which the 
households in that prefecture never fully recovered in the subsequent years. The data show 
that farm production remained very low in the years 1990 and 1991. Rwanda on the whole 
however did not experience a sharp decline of farm output in 1989.  
(2) The health status of children in Rwanda in December 1991, measured by the height-for-age 
antropometric indicator was such that ¼ of the children was moderately undernourished and 
¼ was severly undernourished. For very young children (under 36 months of age in 
December 1991) Gikongoro was doing significantly worse than the other prefectures. 
 
We will first discuss the regression results presented in Table 10a. The first regression 
(Regression 1) adds to the above picture : it shows that the health status of children c an be 
explained by a number of variables of which farm output is one. The regression shows that 
children from households with a higher farm output (in value terms) have a better health status. 
We will discuss econometric problems with this regression hereafter, but first look at the results. 
 
In Regression 1, the shape of the height-for-age curve (in figure 4) is confirmed by the 
significance of both the age variable and the age squared variable. These results on age are a   36 
confirmation of findings in other studies ; this effect is among the best documented effects on 
childrens nutritional status in developing countries. We do not observe a sex-effect in the height-
for-age-z-score.  
 
As far as the characteristics of the mother are concerned, the mother’s age does not have an 
effect on the child’s nutritional status. Her body mass (BMI), on the other hand does. As for 
body mass,  a well-fed and robust mother can invest more time and effort in the well-being of 
her child. The BMI (BMI = weight in kg/(height in m)
2) effect seems reasonable since most 
activities in child care require a lot of physical effort, especially in developing countries. A strong 
mother, ceteris paribus, has less difficulties in lifting her child, carrying her child, feeding her 
child and performing other actvities in the household that benefit the child’s health indirectly. At 
this point it is interesting to look at the results in a paper by A.Bhargava (1997) on the 
determinants of adult well-being in Rwanda. Bhargava found that low incomes and high food 
prices reduce the households’ energy intakes, thereby forcing the adults to spend additional time 
resting and sleeping.
42 He also found that mothers from households with a large number of 
children spent more time working in agriculture. They n amely allocate household tasks to 
children. Bhargava concludes that, since poor nutritional status diminshes adult productivity, 
larger families might be viewed favorably in Rwanda. Since we do not have time allocation data 
in our data set, we cannot test for Bhargava’s findings directly. The variable on household size 
proves insignificant in the regression and does not change the effects of any of the other 
variables.   
 
In order to illustrate the importance of mother’s BMI, we can look a little bit closer at the 
antropometric characteristics of the mothers in our sample. Figure 6 schows the height and the 
weigth of 520 Rwandan mothers. the average mother in Kibungo prefecture is 6 cm taller than 
her counterpart in Gikongoro. Since mother’s height is not determined by the farm output or 
consumption of the last couple of years, we are observing here a long term effect of (under) 
nutrition. Figure 5 shows very well that Gikongoro is in general a poor area, not just in the late 
eighties and early nineties, but across decades. These mothers were undernourished in the period 
of their own youth. In terms of heigth, Gikongoro’s mothers score exceptionally poor. The 
                                                                 
42  Bhargava, A., Nutritional Status and the allocation of time in Rwandese Households,  Journal of 
Econometrics, 77, 1997.   37 
figure also shows that mothers in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi are doing very well compared to the 
rest of Rwanda, especially in terms of weight.  
 





















































































Having a married mother is better for the child’s long term health compared to having a non-
married mother. Ideally, one would have data on intra-household distribution of food, to test for 
this directly, but in the absence of this, we can only  observe the effect of the marriage variable 
on children’s nutritional status.  
 
Another characteristic of the mother benefits the child’s long-term nutritional status, i.e. literacy. 
A mother who can read and write is generally better informed about the practices of child care. 
She can read the users application of medicin, she may have an informed knowledge of child 
feeding practices, she may be more alert towards early signs of child illness, seek early assistance. 
The literacy variable is significant in Regression 1.  
 
Two regional dummies introduced in the model, namely one dummy for the region affected by 
the crop failure and one dummy for the region affected by the civil war both prove significant. 
The civil war in the north of Rwanda (Ruhengeri and Byumba prefectures) has a negative effect 
on the health status of children living in that region. This is also true for children living in the 
region of the crop failure (Gikongoro and parts of Butare prefecture). Since we already observed   38 
the effect of farm output on child health (through the farm output variable), it means that in 
both regions child health is influenced by a region-specific characteristic. In the north, civil war 
negatively influences child health, whereas for Gikongoro, the region specific effect is also 
negative. The latter effect, combined with the linear effect of farm output on child height-over-
age, suggests that the total effect of the crop failure in Gikongoro was non-linear.  This supports 
the thesis that the 1989 season was particularly bad for child health and thus supports our view 
of a crop failure that developed into famine. Caution should be paid to these findings, however. 
The latter effect may be suffering from multicollinearity, a problem we now turn too. 
 
There is problem of endogeneity in Regression 1. This occurs when it is not possible to treat one 
or more explanatory variables as given or exogenous. In such cases, it can be argued that some of 
these explanatory variables are correlated with the equation’s error term. As a result the OLS 
estimator is biased and inconsistent.
43 The problem in fact is that a number of observable and 
non-observable explanatory variables that are correlated with farm output and with health status 
are missing in Regression 1. When one does not correct for this, one misinterpretes the effect of 
farm output on health. The observed effect of farm output is not reflecting the cause of a good 
or a bad health status, but merely the consequence of differences in observed and non-observed 
assets and endownments (land, cattle, household size,…). The solution to this requires an 
alternative estimation method. To derive a consistent estimator, it is necessary that our model is 
identified. For this identification, we use so called instruments or instrumental variables. An 
instrumental variable is a variable that can be assumed to be uncorrelated with the models error 
term, but correlated with farm output. When we allow for an arbitrary number of instruments, 
the estimator is sometimes referred to as the generalized instrumental variables estimator 
(GIVE), also know as the two-stage least squares estimator (2SLS). 
 
The 2SLS procedure allows one to obtain the same estimator in two steps, both of which can be 
estimated by least squares. In the first step, the endogenous variable, farm output is regressed on 
all instruments. In the second step, the original model (with height-for-age as dependent 
variable) is estimated while replacing the endogenous variable (farm output) with its predicted 
value from the first step. 
   39 
This procedure is performed in Regressions 2 and 3. In Regression 2, farm output is predicted 
with one instrumental variable (farm size). The results prove to be similar as those of Regression 
1 with age, age squared, mother’s BMI, the marriage dummy and the predicted farm output 
showing a statistically significant relation with the child’s health status. The literacy variable 
looses its significance. Because the two-stage-least-squares estimation method was used, the 
estimators in regression 2 are consistent. 
 
We can use the estimated coefficients in Regression 2 to calculate the effect of farm output on 
child health in Gikongoro, keeping all other variables on the country mean. This means we 
calculate  
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with height-for-age at the left hand side,  O for farm output, R for Rwanda and G for 
Gikongoro ; 
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The result indicates that the average haz-score (child chronic malnutrition or stunting) for 
Rwanda (–2.07) goes down by 20% (-0.42/-2.07)  when all variables except farm output are set 
on the country mean and farm output in Rwanda is replaced by mean output in Gikongoro. This 
result thus gives the pure effect of farm output in Gikongoro (relative to Rwanda) on child 
nutritional status. 
 
In regression 3, the 2SLS method was used again, but this time 8 instrumental variables were 
used to predict farm output. In the first step, farm output is predicted by area of land cultivated,  
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
43  We refer to Verbeek, M., A Guide to Modern Econometrics, John Wiley and Sons, 2000, Chapter 5 for an 
elaborate discussion of the endogeneity problem and the econometric ways to deal with it.   40 
livestock, two regional dummies and four prices. In the second step, the predicted value of farm 
output from the first step is used as regressor to estimate height-for-age.  Again, the results of 
the estimation are similar to regressions 1 and 2, but the significance of the predicted value of 
farm output has increased a lot compared to regression 2, thereby confirming the validity of our 
results.  The negative effect of household size, observed in regression 2 is now significant (at the 
10% level). 
 
An additional regression was performed using all instrumental variables as explanatory variables 
in an OLS-regression thereby omitting farm output as a regressor. This is regression 4. In this 
regression, mother’s BMI looses its significance. The literacy variable and the distance to the 
health centre become significant, effects we did not observe in regressions 2 and 3. This means 
that there is some kind of multicollinearity going on between farm output, literacy and distance 
to a health centre. Farm output is picking up some of the effects of literacy and distance. Since I 
have tried to deal with multicollinearity in the course of the four regressions discussed in this 
section, we should not overestimate the problem caused by these effects. The civil war dummy is 
now very significant and the significance of the other regional dummy has decreased. New is the 
effect of prices. Increased prices of bananas and potatoes have a significantly negative effect on 
the child’s nutritional status. Both these crops are essential in the Rwandan household economy 
and the Rwandan diet.  
 
The livestock variable, measured as the 3-year average holding of livestock (in tropical units), 
does not have a significant effect on the nutritional status of children. This result is somewhat 
surprising as we have seen that in Rwanda, households saw their livestock holdings decrease in 
the 1989-1991 period. This decrease in livestock is either the result of sales or of direct 
consumption of livestock.
44 Sales can be used to purchase food. This means that household 






                                                                 
44  Neglecting loss or death of livestock.   41 
Table 10b: Regressions of antropometric indicators for children 
6 to 60 months of age, Height-for-age score is dependent variable, n=627 
 
  Regression 5  Regression 6  Regression 7  Regression 8  
  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  OLS   
Child characteristics 
age of child  -0.0422 **  -0.0534 **  -0.0497 **  -0.0039    
  (0.034)  (0.0128)  (0.0216)  (0.133) 
age squared   0.0003    0.0004   0.0004    0.0003  
  (0.249)  (0.1346)  (0.1818)  (0.271) 
sexe  -0.0695  0.0986  -0.0803   0.102 
  (0.577)  (0.4493)  (0.5425)  (0.439) 
characteristics of mother 
age    0.00126   -0.0017  -0.00139  -0.0045 
  (0.893)  (0.8586)  (0.8878)  (0.648) 
body mass index   0.0326    0.03723   0.03363   0.0313 
  (0.143)  (0.1184)  (0.1574)  (0.189) 
read and write   0.198   0.1439   0.1873   0.319 ** 
  (0.142)  (0.3386)  (0.2097)  (0.025) 
married   0.471  **   0.40513 **   0.38466 ***   0.430 ** 
  (0.016)  (0.0470)  (0.0609)  (0.036) 
Household characteristics   
Household size  -0.01916  -0.0534  -0.04808  -0.0153 
  (0.568)  (0.2129)  (0.2303)  (0.673) 
livestock  (cruc) (tlu)      IV  -0.0837 
        (0.210) 
farm size (acres)    IV  IV   0.0025 ** 
        (0.027) 
log farm output (cruc) (FRW)   0.199  **   0.4451 **   0.37148  *** 
  (0.023)  (0.0346)  (0.0263) 
distance to health center  -0.00187  -0.0018  -0.00159  -0.0024  
  (0.235)  (0.2565)  (0.3371)  (0.169) 
regional dummy variables 
crop failure affected region  -0.134    IV  -0.125 
  (0.498)      (0.570) 
civil war affected region  -0.327 **    IV  -0.511 ** 
  (0.041)      (0.049) 
prices 
beans (cruc)      IV   0.019 
        (0.341) 
bananas (cruc)      IV  -0.044 
        (0.207) 
potatoes (cruc)      IV  -0.076 * 
        (0.070) 
sweet potatoes      IV   0.012 
        (0.737) 
Constant  -4.272 ***  -6.333 ***  -5.6052 ***  -1.689 * 
  (0.000)  (0.0019)  (0.0009)  (0.064) 
Adjusted R²   0.054   0.047   0.047   0.052 
N=627 
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significant at the 10% level ; ** significant at the 5% level ; *** significant at the 1% level 
log farm output is instrumented for in regressions 2 and 3 
 
Variables used in the regressions : 
Age of the child in months and its square; 
Sexe 0 for male, 1 for female ; age of the mother in years ; 
Body mass index of the mother is the weight in kilograms divided by the squared height in meters ; 
The read/write and the marriage variables are dummies, with 1 for yes anf 0 for no ; 
The size of the household is the number of household members ; 
Tropical livestock units (tlu’s) 1 for cattle, .25 for pigs, .17 for sheep and goats, .10 for chicken and rabits ; 
The farm size variable is the area of land cultivated by the household ; 
 
In the regressions for Table 10b, the farm output variable is the average value of agricultural production in the 
seasons that are crucial in the child’s growth path, meaning between the 6th and the 23rd month. If, for example, a 
child was 40 months old at the time of the survey (December 1991), he are she was born in september 1988. This 
means that the period March 1989 through September 1990 was the crucial period, which corresponds with the 
agricultural seasons 1989b, 1990a and 1990b. The same reasoning applies to the number of livestock (in tlu’s) and 
the price variables for the regressions in Table 10b. 
 
The regional dummies are 1 for the region affected by the crop failure (Gikongoro and parts of Butare) and for the 
region affected by the civil war (Ruhengeri and Byumba). 
The price variables are avergage deflated prices in the child’s crucial growth period in table10b. 
 
 
In table 10b, we have tried to dig a little bit more in the farm output data. From the literature,  
learn that from a nutritional point of view, the child goes through its most crucial months 
between the 6
th and the 23
rd month after birth. We then asked whether we could find a 
significant effect of farm output on the child’s health status during this period. Ideally we should 
put the output variable in this crucial period in a regression with the average output over the six 
seasons (as was used in table 10a regressions). The multicollinearity problems however were 
evident, and instrumenting did not help, since we could not find good instruments for farm 
output in the child’s crucial period. That is why we used only farm output in the crucial period in 
the regressions reported in table 10b. Since children below the age of 6 months are protected 
from the nutritional environment by their mothers (they only get brestfeeding), these children 
had to be left out from the regressions in table 10b. The results of the regressions 5 to 8 are 
roughly the same as those of regressions 1 to 4, this being not surprising, since we used the same 
estimation methods and only slightly different variables. Prices were taken during the child’s 
crucial nutritional period, just as the number of livestock. We observe that farm output - in the 
crucial period  - has a very significant effect on the health status of the child. A number of other 
variables (mother’s BMI for example) are not significant anymore at the 10% level. Observe also 
the significance of the regional dummy in the region with civil war (norhtern Rwanda). This   43 
variable, as in table 10a seems to be picking up effects that are not picked up by the farm output 
variable. The crop failure region dummy does not show an extra effect for that region, probably 
due to the low number of observations of children from Gikongoro between 6 and 23 months 
of age during the crop failure. As for the prices of staple foods in the crucial period is concerned, 




6. ON FAMINE AND GENOCIDE 
 
6.1. Political economy background 
 
According to the peasants interviewed in a documentary film (details in appendix 2), the 1989 
famine was worse than others because one could not even leave one’s children with the 
neighbours. During earlier famines, peasant families showed more solidarity towards each other’s 
misery. « Rich families would take in children of poor families « a woman said. The film also mentions 4 
cases in which peasants killed thieves in 1989 without intervention of the judicial authorities. 
Taking policing in their own hands was a precursor of much worse violence 5 years later. The 
reasons for the breakdown of solidarity at the end of the eighties may be found, we believe, in 
the duration of the agricultural crisis. If one family has a food problem during a few weeks in a 
specific year, it is not difficult for the neigbours to help this family, but when an entire region 
experiences a crisis for several years in a row, it is not surprising that after a few years people 
have no surplus left to share with others. And the rich lived in Kigali. 
 
Moreover, the mentioned documentary (see appendix 2) also shows how peasants complained 
that fertile land had been occupied by "the rich". The peasants say that the communal authorities 
gave fertile land that previously belonged to the peasants, to a group of wealthy people in order 
to establish a large scale tea-plantation.
45 Peasants were forcibly removed from their land without 
compensation. The wages earned on the tea plantation only covered part of the nutritional needs 
of peasants families. Removal of peasants from their land with little or no compensation also 
occurred in other places in Rwanda, e.g. in Gisovu commune, Kibuye prefecture, also for a tea-
                                                                 
45  IWACU, ibidem.   44 
plantation and again in Gikongoro for a large scale "development project". The latter project 
earmarked land for wealthy people from Kigali as well as for some foreigners.  
 
Interestingly, Pottier argues that the elite in the Habyarimana regime, consisting of  Hutu from 
the North of Rwanda, value land in a special way. When they took power, in 1973, Pottier writes, 
their ambition was to restore their own pre-Tutsi culture – a culture dominated by powerful 
landowners (abakonde) who attracted clients (abagererwa) through land.
46  The institution of 
ubukonde,  restricts access to land and creates political and economic ties between patrons and 
clients. Ubukonde, Pottier argues, is important for understanding food and development policy, 
because the young Hutu state intervened in 1961 to authenticate and legitimate its existence.  
 
 
6.2. From crop failure to famine : the non-response of the Habyarimana regime 
 
The crop failure that struck several communes in Butare and Gikongoro prefectures in 1989 was 
the result of a five year period of drought (starting in 1984) from which the region never really 
recovered. The drought was so severe in 1989 that the roots of crops turned into ash. Crop 
failure however does not have to lead to famine. Indeed, there are numerous cases in which crop 
failures do not cause hunger. Several circumstances can avert famine. If a population has other 
sources of income outside farming, famine can be averted by importing food through usual 
market mechanisms. The population affected by crop failure will buy the necessary food items 
on the market. Policy measures averting famine are well-kwown. The government can 
temporarily employ people in public works (India), the government can hand out food aid to 
vulnerable people, the government can allow aid organisations to hand out food, to name just a 
few policy measures. The literature on famines and real life cases also advise governments to 
stop taxing poor people struck by crop failure. Governments are advised to stop levying taxes 
during famines, requering mandatory labour dues, and school fees. These measures will not avert 
                                                                 
46  Pottier, p. 29.   45 
famine, but will help to ease the burden of a crop failure. None of the aformentioned measures 
were taken by the Habyarimana government in 1989.
47  
 
It is this non-response to famine that should be investigated. Devereux (1993) writes that non-
response to famine (not giving food aid nor taking other measures to avoid famine) is to allow a 
‘Malthusian final solution‘ to happen, namely to equilibrate population with resources. In the 
introductory chapter, I demonstrated some Malthusian influences in the thinking of Rwanda’s 
governing elites. Here however, I first address the motivation behind the non-response. For as 
we have seen, man-made famine can be intentional or non-intentional. Whereas the direct cause 
of the crop failure in Southern Rwanda was a long lasting drought, the relationship between crop 
failure and famine is far more complex. The underlying reasons for a crop failure to develop into 
a famine are identified by a political economy analysis (see sections  3.2, 4.1, 4.2,4.3 ,6.1). When 
actual starvation occurs on a more or less grand scale, immediate measures can be taken to relief 
the starving population. I will now discuss the reasons for non-intervention. 
 
The Rwandan government did not react to the crop failure, it did not provide food or other aid 
and thus allowed a crop failure to develop into famine. The height of the famine occurred in 
June 1989, when the price of beans rose to 60 RWF per kilo. The regime did not mention the 
famine, no government agency or ministry studied it or reacted to it. Only in March 1990, after 
the publication of a documentary film about the famine, the government started providing food 
aid. Although famine conditions became evident from March 1989 onwards, government 
disbursed aid only one year later. The makers of the documentary film we mentioned earlier, 
IWACU, a non-governmental cooperative organisation, made the film explicitly to prove that 
famine existed in the country. 
48 The government was indeed denying that famine existed. The 
refusal to accept that famine struck Southern Rwanda had everything to do with the ruling 
principle of food self-sufficiency. Acknowledging that famine existed would have been the same 
as saying that Rwanda could not feed itself, the latter being the cornerstone of Habyarimana’s 
regime. Famine was the ultimate proof that a policy of food-self-sufficiency at the household, 
communal and national level did not protect households and regions from famine. The 
                                                                 
47  The 1990 report of the Caritas Social Bureau states that (p.26) it would be useful to suppress several 
mandatory taxes such as the personal tax, the tax on cattle, diverse contributions to the MRND, to the 
communal projects,…and voluntary contributions to the Red Cross, the Church and so on. The fact that this 
NGO is giving this advice, is a serious indication that these taxes continued to be levied during the period of 
the famine.   46 
government thus refused to acknowledge that its policy had failed.
49 In order to prevent the 
outside world from getting information about the famine, the government tried to prevent 
journalists to enter the famine region and to write about it. A Belgian journalist was told by 
security chief Augustin Nduwayezu not to write articles which irritated the highest authorities.
50 
The government did not accept aid from foreign governments or international organisations.
51 
This strategy may be wise if one wants to avoid disruption of domestic production, but then one 
should provide relief from domestic sources, meaning organising food transport from food 
surplus to food deficit regions. As we have shown, by the time of the famine in Southern 
Rwanda, Northern and Eastern Rwanda were not experiencing a decline in food production. 
Nevertheless, no transport of food was organised. 
 
Besides not wanting to admit policy failures in the face of the stated self-sufficiency objectives, 
the non-response of the Habyarimana government also had other reasons. A second reason for 
the regime to passively allow the population to starve was that the people living in the famine 
struck region had never been in favour of Habyarimana. The president was considered as a man 
from the North who had shown no interest in the improvement of the living conditions of the 
population in Southern Rwanda including Butare and Gikongoro. Moreover, in the presidential 
elections held in December 1988, in which officially 99% of the population voted in favor of the 
sole candidate, Habyarimana , the population of Gikongoro had voted en masse against the 
president.
52 According to one of our interviewees, a long term and well-informed resident of 
Gikongoro, this result awoke the anger of the president. Nsengiyaremye (1992) writes that the 
elections were falsified : in Gikongoro, the préfet did not even count the votes, but declared that 
Habyarimana got 100% of the vote, which was the target set by Habyarimana's supporters. 
53  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
48  Iwacu, personal conversation, Kigali, August 12, 2000. 
49  During one interview, a respondent told the author that the Rwandan bureaucrats under Habyarimana were 
used to tell their superiors only the things that pleased them, hiding real problems. While this attitude may 
have retarded the reaction of the regime, one cannot conclude from this that the president was uninformed 
about the famine.  
50  Prunier, G., The Rwanda Crisis, History of a Genocide, 1995, p. 87-88. 
51  Iwacu, personal conversation, Kigali, August 12, 2000. 
52  Interview, Kigali, August 13, 2000. Unofficial results say that 78% to 90% of the population voted against 
Habyarimana in December 1988. Another informant told us that the Gikongoro population already voted 
against the president in the 1978 election. 
53  Nsengiyaremye, D., La Transition Démocratique au Rwanda (1989-1993) in Guichaoua, A., Les Crises 
politiques au Burundi et Rwanda (1993-1994), Université de Lille, 1995, p. 242.   47 
In addition, it is known that during his regime people from the south (Hutu as well as Tutsi) did 
not get promoted in the administration. All senior posts went to people from Habyarimana’s 
own region. Fr. Nzamurambaho for example, a popular politician from Gikongoro and a former 
minister of Agriculture wanted to present himself in the November 1988 legislative elections. He 
was removed from the list of candidates without any explanation. The president, everybody 
knew, only wanted people who depended on him and who were completely loyal to him. 
54 
 
Thirdly, the famine-struck prefectures, Gikongoro and parts of Butare, and especially the part of 
both these prefectures that was used to be called Nyaruguru, had a large Tutsi population. 
Several sources indicate that, by 1989 or even earlier, president Habyarimana was informed of 
the probability of a military invasion of Rwanda by the FPR. This can be documented as follows 
: in May 1989, at the summet of Nyagatare, the president of Uganda, Museveni, told 
Habyarimana that he had better solve the refugee problem if he wanted to avoid a military attack. 
55 All over Uganda people were talking about it and one can assume that Habyarimana’s secret 
service also monitored the build up of the rebel movement. The year before, in 1988, Tutsi in the 
diaspora had held a major conference in Washington DC. One of the conclusions of this 
conference was the desire and the right to return. As early as 1987, Tutsi leaders in the diaspora 
were fundraising for an invasion.
56 The embassies of Rwanda in Kampala, Nairobi, Addis-Abeba 
and Washington had warned the Rwandan government of the preparations for an invasion.
57 In 
1989, at the high point of the famine in Southern Rwanda, a fraction of the FPR made an 
abortive attack in north Rwanda. Ogetunnu writes that Habyarimana's intelligence service had 
several officers from the FPR on its payroll in order to sow division inside the FPR. This means 
that even before the famine was under way, Habyarimana knew of the build up of FPR forces in 
Uganda.  
 
Therefore, the question is whether information on an upcoming civil war influenced the decision 
not to intervene in Gikongoro in 1989. Had Habyarimana already made up his mind in 1989, to 
consider the Tutsi inside Rwanda as accomplices of the FPR and thus as enemies of his regime ? 
In the event of an FPR attack, Habyarimana may have anticipated that young Tutsi from Rwanda 
                                                                 
54  Nsengiyaremye, D., ibidem, p. 242 
55  Nsengiyaremye, D., ibidem p.247 and interview, Kigali, August 14, 2000  
56  Adelman, H. and Suhrke, A., The Path of a Genocide: the Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, Transaction 
      Publishers, 1999 
57  Nsengiyaremye, D., ibidem, p. 247   48 
would join the FPR forces (which eventually happened). The author interviewed several 
survivors from the genocide in Gikongoro who confirm that a number of young men from 
Gikongoro joined the FPR before the 1990 attack.
58 Moreover, the regime’s leadership 
considered Gikongoro prefecture quasi-lost to the FPR as it would be very easy to penetrate the 
prefecture through Nyungwe forest from Burundian territory.  There is an extra reason related to 
this war strategy. If Habyarimana anticipated an upcoming civil war, he would preserve the 
country’s food stocks (however small or large they may have been) for his own soldiers. Indeed, 
why feed a population in the south that did not favor him in the first place and of which a 




6.3. The 1989 famine as a prelude to the 1994 genocide 
 
When one combines the different elements discussed in the previous sections, namely the 
peasant and self-sufficiency ideology, the populist approach to population growth, and the 
reaction to the crop failure , then the following picture emerges. 
 
Severe drought causing crop failure in southern Rwanda in 1989, by itself did not lead to famine. 
Famine only occurs when governments allow it to take place. It is my thesis in this chapter that 
the Habyarimana government knowingly allowed a crop failure to develop into famine in 
southern Rwanda in 1989.  
 
We have seen that the peasantry can only escape the malthusian trap of high population growth 
and declining agricultural productivity when governments promote technological innovations. 
The Habyarimana government has never done so. The regime’s advice to the peasants was to 
apply more labor to the already degraded soils, as if the Rwandan farmers where not numerous 
enough to work the land.  
 
 
                                                                 
58  Interview, Kigali, October 12, 2000.   49 
As a result of the mismanagment of agriculture, peasants were oriented towards subsistence 
production, a situation in which they were highly vulnerable to crop failure and direct 
entitlement loss. We have seen that a policy of food-selfsufficiency is anti-pastoral. Pastoralists 
do not cultivate crops to secure their living. And, empirical research has shown that cultivators 
do not want to grow only food to secure their food-security. Apart from tea and coffee, the 
government nevertheless relied on a policy of cultivation of all available land to achieve higher 
food production. Once all the land was put into cultivation, peasants were unable to keep food 
production and population growth in balance because no attention was paid to technological 
innovation, fertilizer use, credit and market development. The forcefully promoted and 
monitored cultivation of coffee was not beneficial anymore to the peasants from the end of the 
eighties onwards ; they preferred to grow cash crops for the domestic market such as bananas 
for the production of beer, a choice the Habyrimana regime opposed. 
 
In contrast to the peasant-friendly rhetoric, we have seen that the agricultural policies benefitted 
the commercial and political elite. Very few funds – expressed as a fraction of government 
budget - were invested in agriculture. Altough 50% of the deposits in the Banques Populaires 
came from peasants, they were only receving 10% of the loans.  We have shown that the 
Habyarimana regime never cared to set up a functioning food marketing system. The access to 
food was considered a local and personal problem, to be settled by patron-client relationships. 
This attitude, together with the officially sanctionned slogan  of food-self-suffiency, led the 
regime to deny and neglect the famine in southern Rwanda in 1989. As K.Jonassohn (1999) has 
recently argued that 
“In the present stage of the world’s development, the presence of serious starvation in a group is one of the 
first sure signs that this group has been singled out for victimization “ 
 
The refusal to assist a starving population does not only hurt young men and potential soldiers, 
but also women and children. A strategy of preventing food aid may then be genocidal. To be 
sure, for lack of documents, I cannot prove this strategy or the genocidal intent of the refusal to 
provide food aid. Some evidence, advanced by Kinyamateka, indeed points at self-enrichment and 
embezzlement of government funds destined to buy food. Is this explanation incompatible with 
a  political, strategic or genocidal motivation ? I do not know. In any case, the story of the crop 
failure in southern Rwanda gives ample evidence that the Habyarimana regime knowingly 
allowed famine to occur. According to my research, Habyarimana’s agricultural policy, in   50 
particular its ideological underpinnings, its political motivations and its economic consequences 
for the Rwandan peasantry are an important part of a process that eventually led to genocide. 
 
When, after a revealing documentary produced by IWACU in February 1990, president 
Habyarimana visited the famine-prone region in March 1990, he told the press that his 
administration had hidden this event for him, that he was not aware that famine was occuring in 
Rwanda. Granting that the president’s aides did not tell him everything, we believe that he lied at 
this point. From our interviews in Kigali with close collaborators of the former president, we 
know that he received detailed intelligence reports twice a day about everything that happened in 
the country. It is highly unlikely that the highest authority was not aware of a famine that struck 




                                                                 
59 Discussing the credibility of Habyarimana, one should not forget that only 7 months after his denial of famine 
conditions, in October 1990, the same president, Habyarimana, organised massacres in Mutura and Kibilira 
(documented in a report of FIDH, an organisation of international human rights groups, 1993). The targets of these 
local massacres were the local Tutsi, known for their pastoral way of living.  We should also keep in mind that the 
same president later on organised a fake attack on Kigali in order to draw in more French troops and that the same 
president imprisoned 10.000 Kigali citizens, mainly Tutsi, on ch arges of conspiracy with the FPR. It is the same 
president, Habyarimana, who denied to the press and to diplomats that massacres occurred in Rwanda in 1990, 1991 
and 1992 in which about 2.000 Tutsi were killed. 
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APPENDIX 1   Figure A1 : Famine struck region in Butare en Gikongoro Prefectures 
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Most struck  communes are indicated with their first letter: in Gikongoro: Mubuga, 
Rwamiko, Nyamagabe, Kinyamakara, Mudasomwa, Karama, Karambo, Rukondo, 
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APPENDIX 2 
Published sources documenting famine in Southern Rwanda 
 
One of the most interesting examples of the documentation of the food crisis in southern Rwanda is a film. In 
February 1990, a group of researchers working with IWACU, a cooperative organisation working in the rural areas, 
produced a film, “Haguma Amagara” which means “you only live once”. The film was a response of this grass-roots 
organisation to the silence of the Habyarimana regime. Since the regime refused to acknowledge the famine, which 
in February 1990 was already going on for more then eight months, IWACU decided to film the evidence. The film 
shows poor peasants in southern Rwanda having nothing to eat, showing markets without products, peasants 
deconstructing their houses to sell the parts for food, peasants migrating to other parts of Rwanda and to Burundi, 
hungry children and mothers, adult males who are telling the film-maker that they are to weak to work. The film 
indeed documents hunger in southern Rwanda in the 1989-1990 period. We come back on interviews with peasants 
in this documentary when we discuss the causes of the famine. 
 
Apart from the film, several Rwandan organisations have documented the food crisis and have published reports on 
it. The author was able to trace three valuable reports. These reports were published over a period of more than two 
and a half years. The first was written by the Social Bureau of Caritas in Kigali.60 The report cites administrative and 
communal sources documenting hunger and starvation in several communes of Butare (Nyakizu, Runyinya) and 
Gikongoro (Nyamagabe, Karama). It counts the number of death people due to starvation by commune : 5 in 
Karama, 30 in Nyakizu and 107 in Nyamagabe. On top, 2.316 people had left Nyakizu to find food or work 
elsewhere. (p.3) In Runyinya commune, about one hundred children had left school and 500 in Karama. Many 
husbands had temporarily migrated. Crops were stolen at night and several cases of suicide had been reported.(p.11) 
Peasants also report the absence of solidarity among neigbours. (p.19) In Gikongoro, peasants hoped that the next 
coffee harvest would be good, if not they would starve to death (p.16-17). The Caritas report concluded that there 
was nothing to eat anymore in the south, peasants were already eating the leaves and the roots of their plants. 
Peasants had sold their belongings at low prices to secure some cash.  
 
The second report was written by staff of the grass-roots NGO called CCOAIB, but the author could not get hold 
of this report . 61 The third was a report on a local agricultural survey of 300 households in several communes by the 
Agricultural Development Project in Gikongoro. This project was run by the Ministry of Agriculture. 62 This report 
stated that 25% of the surveyed households were indigent and that female headed households suffered more. Two 
of the reports used the word  ‘famine‘ to describe the food crisis in Southern Rwanda and the third spoke of 
starvation. 
                                                                 
60  Les Retombées de la Famine dans les Préfectures de Butare et de Gikongoro, Bureau Social Urbain-Caritas, 
Kigali, Février 1990, 26 p. 
61  Twizeyimana, P., and Uwimana, V., Portrait de la Pénurie alimentaire actuelle au Rwanda. Dévoilement 
d‘une famine cachéé sous la verdure, CCOAIB, Kigali, Novembre 1989, 43 p. Several attempts to get a copy 
of this report in Rwanda failed. 
62  Gascon, J.-F., Pauvreté a Gikongoro, Résultats de l’enquête réalisée aupres des ménages indigents, Projet de 
Development Agricole de Gikongoro, Document de travail, n.156, Juin 1992, 62 p.   53 
 
Kinyamateka, the most important independent newspaper in Rwanda, also published information on the food crisis 
in 1989. The newspaper’s articles infact made the famine known to the Rwandan public. André Sibomana, editor of 
the newspaper in 1989, expressed it as follows  :  
« In 1989, a terrible famine struck the south of the country. There was a natural explanation for this phenomenon, but the 
authorities did nothing to improve the situation. Worse still, I had evidence that part of the government’s assistance which was 
intended for the population at risk had been diverted. It was a scandal. I decided to publish this information. We were 
threatened and we were called liars, until I published photographs which were overwhelming. This had an immediate effect. 
Readers wrote in to express their satisfaction : at last the truth was being told. »
63  
 
APPENDIX 3 : Figure A3 : Value of Production in 10 seasons 
 
  87a  87b  88a  88b  89a 
  prod  %p  prod  %p  prod  %p  prod  %p  prod  %p 
Ruhengeri  26775  40  23020  43.2  29377  32.7  21164  50.9  27770  44.5 
Butare  31285  35.6  30707  37.9  27111  39.4  30168  41.2  24627  46.3 
Buymba  29323  40  35121  28.6  28142  37.8  30474  36.0  26012  50.5 
Cyangugu  24833  45.8  25240  36.9  25447  36.1  24550  39.8  21699  60.0 
Gikongoro  19796  62.7  19137  64.3  18744  65.5  19043  59.5  13347  81.3 
Gisenyi  23710  59.1  20137  71.2  26934  53.6  17799  73.6  22771  60.2 
Gitarama  33396  25.4  38733  21.4  33271  25.9  34245  27.5  33639  25.8 
Kibungo  35617  15.7  39722  14.5  34305  19.0  39361  11.9  38661  24.2 
Kibuye  25803  55.4  15584  78.6  29583  48.2  14906  75.6  20064  63.5 
Kigali  35419  26.8  47539  22.9  38964  23.0  44777  30.9  40727  21.7 
 
Rwanda  29171  39.3  30702  40.1  29684  37.1  28693  43.5  27589  45.8 
N  1073    1089    1076    1075    1211   
 
Production for these 10 seasons is the value of total production of 8 crops : bananas, potatoes, sweet potatoes, 
beans, mais, peas, sorghum and manoic. 
%p is the percentage of households that has a value of production lower then 2/3 of the mean value of production 
in Rwanda in 1987a. This mean value was 19.447 RWF. 
 
 
  89b  90a  90b  91a  91b 
  prod  %p  prod  %p  prod  %p  prod  %p  prod  %p 
Ruhengeri  22030  66.9  26636  57.0  24089  56.3  28499  48.8  21937  59.7 
Butare  27612  48.7  22760  55.5  24484  55.2  16399  66.9  20697  59.6 
Buymba  31073  42.9  31003  44.9  33185  42.2  -  -  -  - 
Cyangugu  22910  57.3  19492  63.2  17604  69.5  19571  71.4  17299  68.9 
Gikongoro  9853  86.2  10014  86.2  12699  81.9  13848  83.5  12102  80.7 
Gisenyi  14036  80.0  22855  64.1  15839  73.4  17761  69.8  14215  76.9 
Gitarama  38299  25.9  32070  29.3  32879  29.1  25845  45.1  31268  40.3 
Kibungo  52659  22.1  44268  27.1  39231  22.1  34216  34.1  32380  32.3 
Kibuye  11123  82.3  17866  64.1  11846  89.4  16855  73.3  11624  85.9 
Kigali  52922  18.2  41386  24.7  37629  28.8  30635  38.5  37186  30.7 
 
Rwanda  29247  50.9  27691  49.5  25935  52.4  23072  57.1  23687  56.3 
N    1202    1230    1230    1038    1022 
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APPENDIX 4 : Insights from the model of the peasant household 
 
The model of the peasant household provides a good framework to discuss the effects of changes in food prices. 
This is important for the topic of this paper, as we have seen that the Habyarimana government believed that high 
food prices offer an incentive for producers to produce more food. With the help of our household model, we can 
judge the effects of such a policy of high food prices on the production and consumption decisions of peasants. 
 
One possible application of the household model is found in the human resource development literature. 
Households obtain consumption not only from marketed goods, but also from goods which are produced at home 
using household labor. As Udry and Bardhan (1998) state, one’s utility may depend on a vector of consumption 
goods c and on health, which depends on c and on time spent at home «producing» health.64 The household 
problem, then, can be written as 
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where L c is household labor devoted to producing health. The separation property is maintained with respect to 
production on the farm, but the production of health depends on preferences. The effect of prices on consumption 
can be written as 
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(1)  is the direct effect on consumption for given income 
(2)  is the profit effect  
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a q        (1.3) 
  (3)          (4)      (5) 
 
(3)  is a pure substitution effect and is negative 
(4)  is the marketed surplus  (+) or decifit (-) 





And, substituting (1.3) and (1.4) in (1.2), yields 
 



























































   
 
A health demand function can be directly derived from the household model. The demand for health, as expressed 
in several antropometric measures such as height for age, weight for height and weigth for age depends only on the 
price of basic food crops, child characteristics and community factors. 
 
Assuming that p a is the price of beans, the derivation makes clear that peasants who do not produce beans (e.g. 
landless peasants) will see their consumption of beans decline as a result of the price increase. The effect on bean 
producers is less clear, it can be either positive or negative, depending on the effect of the price increase on the 
marketed surplus(qa –ca) : 
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(6)  is a production incentive and is positive 
(7)  is a pure substitution effect and negative (postive when we consider the –sign) 
(8)  is the marketed surplus  
(9)  is the income effect and is positive (negative when we consider the –sign) 
 
the effect of pa on the marketed surplus depends thus on the sign and the size of (8) and (9) versus (6) and (7). If the 
income effect is very large and stronger than the combined effects on production and substitution, then the overall 
effect on the marketed surplus is negative.  
 
In a land scarce environment, such as Rwanda, peasant’s capacity to grow their own food decreases and they need to 
purchase food on the market. A price increase of beans lowers bean consumption of landless peasants and peasants 
who do not produce enough beans for their own consumption.65 For landed and bean producing peasants, the 
effect depends on the income elasticity of bean consumption. If this is very large, peasants may produce more 
beans, not for the market but for their own consumption. 
 
The model of the peasant household as outlined above shows that price policies to « preserve the income of the 
peasant » or « to increase bean production » may effect (parts of) the peasantry in the opposite way. The policy of 
high bean prices only benefits wealthy, landed elites who can afford to produce beans for the market. Landless 
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